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INTRODUCTION

Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930' (section 526) permits
an American citizen or business entity which owns a registered
United States trademark in a foreign product to prevent unauthorized importation of goods bearing that mark.2 Accordingly,
I 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982) (originally enacted as Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356,
§ 526, 42 Stat. 975, repealed and re-enacted as Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 526, 46
Stat. 741).
2 Section 526(a) of the Act provides:
[I]t shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise
of foreign manufacture if such merchandise, or the label, sign, print,
package, wrapper, or receptacle, bears a trademark owned by a citizen
of, or by a corporation or association created or organized within, the
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Customs Service regulations which implement this statute, codified at 19 C.F.R. § 133.21, direct Customs agents to seize unauthorized imports in most instances.' The Customs Service
permits unauthorized importation of foreign-made goods, however, when a United States and foreign trademark owner are the
same entity, parent and subsidiary, or subject to common control.4 As a result of the common control exceptions contained in
19 C.F.R. § 133.21, so-called "gray goods" have long been permitted to enter the country. 5
"Gray goods," or "parallel imports," are genuine, foreign
United States, and registered in the Patent and Trademark Office by a
person domiciled in the United States, under the provisions of sections
81 to 109 of title 15, and if a copy of the certificate of registration of
such trademark is filed with the Secretary of the Treasury, in the manner
provided in section 106 of said title 15, unless written consent of the
owner of such trademark is produced at the time of making entry.
19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982).
3 19 C.F.R. §§ 133.21(a)-(b) (1987). These regulations provide:
(a) Copying or simulating marks or names. Articles of foreign or domestic
manufacture bearing a mark or name copying or simulating a recorded
trademark or trade name shall be denied entry and are subject to forfeiture as prohibited importations. A "copying or simulating" mark or
name is an actual counterfeit of the recorded mark or name or is one
which so resembles it as to be likely to cause the public to associate the
copying or simulating mark with the recorded mark or name.
(b) Identical trademark. Foreign-made articles bearing a trademark identical with one owned and recorded by a citizen of the United States or a
corporation or association created or organized within the United States
are subject to seizure and forfeiture as prohibited importations.
Id.
4 19 C.F.R. §§ 133.21(c)(1-3) (1987). These regulations provide:
(c) Restrictions not applicable. The restrictions set forth in paragraphs (a)
and (b) of this section do not apply to imported articles when:
(1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade name are owned
by the same person or business entity;
(2) The foreign and the domestic trademark or trade name owners are
parent and subsidiary companies or otherwise subject to common ownership or control (see subsecs. 133.2(d) and 133.12(d));
(3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or
tradename applied under authorization of the U.S. owner.
Id.
5 See Olympus Corp. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 911, 913 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff'd, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986), petitionfor cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3372 (U.S. Nov.
11, 1986) (No. 86-757); Brief for Appellants at 7, Coalition to Preserve the Integrity
of American Trademarks v. United States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (No. 845890), affd in part, reh'g granted sub nom. K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 56 U.S.L.W.
4219 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1988) (Nos. 86-495, 86-624, 86-625). See also, Note, The Graying
of American Trademarks: The Genuine Goods Exclusion Act and The Incongruity of Customs
Regulation 19 C.F.R. § 133.21, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 83-84 n.4 (1985) (authored
by Maureen Beyers) (citing Outline of Speech by Susan W. Liebeler, Vice-Chairman, United States International Trade Commission, Gray-Market Imports, before
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made products bearing trademarks owned by American citizens
or business entities which are purchased in foreign markets by
third parties and imported without permission from the domestic
trademark owner.6 Taking advantage of favorable exchange
the Second Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of International
Trade (Oct. 23, 1985)).
6 See Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States Customs Service, 575 F. Supp. 416,
418 (S.D. Fla. 1983). " 'Gray market' goods are goods produced by a foreign manufacturer and bearing that manufacturer's trademark, which are purchased abroad
and imported into this country by persons other than the manufacturer's authorized United States distributor." Id. See also 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30:35 (2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 1986).
The "gray market" affects a variety of affiliated foreign and domestic entities.
See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 791 (1986). Indeed, "the variations of the gray market are myriad." Id.
The Vivitar court elaborated:
[T]he U.S. and foreign trademark rights may be owned by the same entity or by related companies, or by wholly separate companies. The
goods of the U.S. owner may be identical to or different from, the parallel import. Goods may be produced in the U.S. by the U.S. trademark
owner and different goods produced abroad by its affiliate. Services and
warranties may or may not be the same here as abroad. A foreign licensee (i.e., related company) may be required by foreign law and may not
be subject to meaningful control by the U.S. owner.
Id. at 1570 n.24 (citing Takamatsu, ParallelImportation of Trademarked Goods: A Comparative Analysis, 57 WASH. L. REV. 433 (1982)).
The Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT), a
trade association of approximately fifty companies and trade associations, suggests
that "[g]ray market goods include virtually all types of consumer products." See
Comments of The Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks, at
Appendix A, 1 (Oct. 20, 1986), In re Importations Bearing Recorded U.S. Trademarks, Solicitation of Public Comment on Gray Market Policy Options, 51 Fed.
Reg. 22,005 (1986) (U.S. Customs Service Treas. Dept.) [hereinafter Comments of
COPIAT, Solicitation of Public Comment]. As illustrative examples of gray marketed products, COPIAT states that
[w]ell known, branded items such as Dial soap, Procter & Gamble detergent, Seiko, Rolex and Citizen watches, Nikon, Hasselblad and Canon
cameras, Sony, Maxell and Panasonic electronic equipment, Reach
toothbrushes, Colgate toothpaste, Yves Saint Laurent Opium fragrances, Duracell batteries, Johnson and Johnson baby powder, Pepsi
Cola, Kodak Film[,] Mercury outboard motors, Rossignol skis, Michelin
tires and Lladro porcelain are traded on the gray market, to name but a
few.
Id.
Additional product categories in which gray goods are marketed include, but
are not limited to, automobiles, computers, office equipment, mobile telephones,
beer and wine. See Deigh, A Cheaper Way to Get the Goods, Insight, Oct. 21, 1985, at
56; Beer, wine industry fight over import bill, San Francisco Examiner, July 15, 1985).
Purveyors of so-called "gray" goods prefer to call their wares "parallel imports," and themselves "parallel importers," suggesting that the adjective "gray"
carries an "innuendo of impropriety or borderline legality." See Brief for 47th
Street Photo, Inc. at 4 n.2, Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir.
1986) (No. 85-6282), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3372 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1986)
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rates or weak foreign markets, gray marketeers purchase legitimate trademarked goods abroad for less than domestic wholesale.7 In turn, they typically resell "gray" wares to consumers in
this country at significant retail discounts.8 Due largely to strong
purchasing power of the United States dollar during the first half
of this decade, the "gray market" has grown considerably in recent years. 9
As a matter of public policy, gray marketeers suggest that the
gray market benefits consumers by providing genuine goods at
(No. 86-757). This author will use the terms "gray goods," "gray market" and
"gray marketeer" to reflect common usage and in the interest of uniformity, not to
suggest impropriety.
7 See W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik v. Action Indus., 589 F. Supp. 763, 764 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). "A gray market is created when an arbitrageur takes advantage of
a price difference between two markets by buying in the market where prices are
lower and selling in the market where prices are higher." Id. See also, Collado Associates, The Economic Impact of Diversion 65-69 (Sept. 1984) (unpublished manuscript) (available in the files of THE SETON HALL LAW REVIEW) (providing case
histories of gray market prices fluctuating with currency exchange rates). Gray
marketeers state that the gray market arises because different affiliates of a given
manufacturer may sell the same trademarked article for different prices at any given
time. See Brief for 47th Street Photo, Inc. at 4, Olympus v. United States, 792 F.2d
315 (2d Cir. 1986) (No. 85-6282), petitionfor cert.filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3372 (U.S. Nov.
11, 1986) (No. 86-757). COPIAT also acknowledges that currency fluctuation is
one factor which enhances the profitability of gray marketeering. See Comments of
COPIAT, Solicitation of Public Comment, supra note 6, at 14-15. COPIAT contends, however, that the gray marketeer's primary source of profits is not lower
initial cost, but rather that the gray marketeer incurs few if any additional costs for
advertising and post-sale support. Id. at 10-16. See also notes 8, 16 infra and accompanying text.
8 Gray marketeers state that gray goods are usually sold to consumers for less
than the manufacturer's suggested retail price. See Brief for 47th Street Photo, Inc.
at 3, Olympus v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986) (No. 85-6282), petition
for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3372 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1986) (No. 86-757). 47th Street
Photo, Inc., a leading gray marketeer, asserts that "parallel importation permits the
American consumer to buy these goods at prices substantially below the inflated
prices sought by the multinational corporation from American consumers." Id. at
4.
COPIAT suggests it is a myth that gray goods are uniformly less expensive
than authorized imports and alleges that "gray market and authorized products
generally sell for the same price." Comments of COPIAT, Solicitation of Public
Comment, supra note 6, at 33. See also id. at 27-35 (supporting COPIAT's position
that gray goods are no less expensive than authorized imports).
9 See Feder, "Gray Market" Grew with Rise of Dollar, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1986, at
D7, col. 2 (citing Lexecon, Inc., The Economics of Gray-Market Imports (May
1985) (estimating domestic retail sales of gray goods to range between $5 and $7
billion per year)). Estimates vary on the total volume of domestic gray market sales.
Id. The New York Times observed that "no one is quite sure how large the gray
market is." Id. See also Riley, "Gray Market" Fight Isn't Black and White, Nat'l L.J.,
Oct. 28, 1985, at 1, col. 4 (gray market estimated as high as $10 billion per year).
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low prices,'O by fostering competition, ' and preventing discriminatory United States pricing of foreign-made goods.' 2 Trademark owners, on the other hand, contend that the gray market3
threatens to harm irreparably their valuable domestic good will'
by causing customer confusion.' 4 They also assert that gray mar10 See Brief for 47th Street Photo, Inc. at 3, Olympus v. United States, 792 F.2d
315 (2d Cir. 1986) (No. 85-6282), petitionfor cert.filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3372 (U.S. Nov.
11, 1986) (No. 86-757). Gray marketeers contend that by purchasing authentic
goods in international markets, they are able to provide the American consumer
with genuine foreign-made articles at prices which reflect their "true value in international markets." Id. In support of this position, 47th Street Photo has provided
voluminous evidence of its substantial retail discounts. See id. at Appendix I.
Gray marketeers also assert that, given a choice, many consumers affirmatively
prefer gray goods. See Market Probe Int'l, Inc., Consumer Opinions Relative to the
Purchase of Four Product Categories-A Central Location Survey, 17 (Sept. 1984)
(unpublished manuscript) (available in the files of THE SETON HALL LAw REVIEW)
("By a margin of better than two to one," consumers would clearly prefer to pay a
lower price for an item and accept an equivalent warranty from a distributor or
retailer rather than pay a higher price and accept an equivalent warranty from the
trademark owner.).
I' See Brief for 47th Street Photo, Inc. at 3, Olympus v. United States, 792 F.2d
315 (2d Cir. 1986) (No. 85-6282), petitionfor cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3372 (U.S. Nov.
11, 1986) (No. 86-757). Gray marketeers suggest that they compete with the socalled "authorized distributors" by offering "authentic" goods which they purchase
in foreign markets, "openly" bring into this country, and offer for sale to consumers at "realistic prices." Id.
12 See Brief for Petitioner 47th Street Photo, Inc. at 2, K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc., 56 U.S.L.W. 4219 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1988) (Nos. 86-495, 86-624, 86-625) [hereinafter Brief for 47th Street Photo]. See infra note 25 (discussing consolidation of this
action). Gray marketeers contend that multinational corporations establish artificially high domestic price structures by setting up closely affiliated United States
entities and assigning United States trademarks to them to take advantage of permissive American trademark law. Id.
13 Good will has been defined as "the favorable consideration shown by the
purchasing public to goods known to emanate from a particular source." White
Tower System, Inc. v. White Castle System of Eating Houses Corp., 90 F.2d 67, 69
(6th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 720 (1937). Another frequently cited definition states:
Good will is that which makes tomorrow's business more than an accident. It is the reasonable expectation of future patronage based on past
satisfactory dealings. Promiscuous and casual customers or clients do
not pay the profits. Those who come regularly do.... It is this hope
and profitability that keeps a business going and gives it a selling value
above that of its leasehold, equipment and stock.
ROGERS, GOOD WILL, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR TRADING 13 (1914). Lord Eldon
defined good will as "the probability that the old customers will resort to the old
place." Cruttwell v. Lye, 34 Eng. Rep. 129 (Ch. 1810). Judge Pitney posited Lord
Eldon's statement contained "the germ of all modern definitions." See v. Heppenheimer, 69 N.J. Eq. 36, 44, 61 A. 843, 846 (1905).
14 See Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1167-69 (S.D.N.Y.
1984). Trademark owners contend that gray goods harm good will by causing customer confusion in a variety of ways. Id. First, consumers are often not informed
that they are purchasing an unauthorized import. Id. at 1167. But see infra note 21
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keteers are permitted to take a "free ride" on the trademark owners' good will' 5 and cause them to lose sales outside authorized
(discussing N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 218-aa (McKinney 1986)). As a result, good will
may be harmed when a consumer learns that a product is not under United States
warranty. Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1167-68. Commenting on this practice, Judge
Leval stated that gray marketeers "tell the customers the good news about their
cheap prices," but "conceal or affirmatively misrepresent the bad news." Id. at
1168. The judge continued that when a consumer presents an unauthorized import product for warranty service, the trademark owner must either absorb the cost
of repair or risk further harm to good will in the trademark. Id. See also Collado
supra note 7, at 25-26. Likewise, the purchaser of an unauthorized import product
is not entitled to promotional rebates offered by the United States trademark
owner. Id. at 64-65.
COPIAT suggests that additional sources of confusion include improper labelling, inadequate instruction information, and inadequate warranty service by gray
market distributors. See generally Comments of COPIAT, Solicitation of Public Comment, supra note 6, at Appendix A. Further, COPIAT contends that gray goods
cause customer confusion because they are allegedly dissimilar from products intended for United States distribution. See id. at 19. As illustrative examples,
COPIAT points out:
Cameras may be calibrated metrically rather than in feet and inches;
electronic products may operate only with foreign voltage requirements
and may not be serviceable in the United States ....
In addition, gray
market goods may not have been packaged for international transshipment ... [as a result of which] batteries may have a shortened life ....
Gray market products that are ingested or applied, such as food, cosmetics, fragrances and pharmaceuticals, may be prepared differently for
foreign markets and . . . may lack ingredients essential to proper performance . . . [or contain] ingredients which are prohibited by federal
law because they may cause severe allergic reactions or may be carcinogenic ....
Id. at Appendix A, 3-4.
Gray goods also harm good will by causing disaffection among a trademark
owners network of authorized dealers. See Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1168. Accord Collado, supra note 7, at 51. See also supra note 16.
15 To develop good will in this country, a trademark owner incurs a variety of
expenses not shared by gray marketeers. See Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1166-68.
These expenses include brand advertising and sales promotion, inventory maintenance, dealer training, customer relations, and warranty service. Id. In addition,
trademark owners often incur expenses for research and development, package design, modification of products to conform with federal law, marketing research, test
marketing, as well as domestic assembly and packaging facilities. See Collado, supra
note 7, at 9-10. Indeed, "[i]t cannot be denied that a third party who purchases
merchandise abroad, then imports it and sells in competition with the American
trademark registrant, gets the benefit of free advertising in the American Market."
Atwood, Import Restrictions on Trademarked Merchandise-The Role of the United States
Bureau of Customs, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 301, 308 (1969).
COPIAT suggests that one of the primary reasons gray marketeering is profitable is because gray marketeers do not incur the marketing and support service costs
of a trademark owner. See Comments of COPIAT, Solicitation of Public Comment,
supra note 6, at 12. Although gray marketeers suggest that they, too, incur retail
advertising costs and offer their own warranties to consumers, the Osawa court considered these measures to be a "superficial solution" because gray marketeers lack
incentive to maintain good will. 589 F. Supp. at 1169.

1988]

COMMENT

61

channels of distribution.16
To remedy these perceived inequities, in recent years United
States trademark owners have pursued regulatory, judicial and
legislative remedies to impede the importation of gray goods.
Initially, trademark owners requested that the Customs Service
delete the common control exceptions in 19 C.F.R. § 133.21."7
Under both the private remedy provision of section 52618 and the
16 United States trademark owners who market foreign-made goods typically establish a network of authorized retail dealers. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761
F.2d 1552, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986). These authorized dealers are responsible for promotion, support and service to maintain the
good will of the mark in this country. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 844, 850 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd 790
F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), affid in part, reh 'g grantedsub nom. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc., 56 U.S.L.W. 4219 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1988) (Nos. 86-495, 86-624, 86-625). Moreover, authorized dealers, who are often trained by the trademark owner, educate
the public on product benefits. See Collado, supra note 7, at 17-20. Where the
product is expensive and complex, the role of the dealership network is particularly
important in establishing a relationship with the consumer to facilitate service and
future purchase of peripheral equipment. See Osawa, 598 F. Supp. at 1166.
United States trademark owners claim that the activities of unauthorized dealers, or gray marketeers have caused a drastic decrease in sales to authorized distributors. See id. at 1168. The Osawa court stated that "[c]ompetition from gray
marketeers has caused demoralization, disaffection and misunderstanding among
authorized dealers." Id. Trademark owners also contend that gray market activity
causes general loss of revenue "due to lost sales of products manufactured in this
country." See Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks, 598 F. Supp. at
850.
17 See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420, 423-24 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1984), aff'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986) (noting denial of requests for letter rulings from Customs Service to amend 19 C.F.R.
§ 133.21(c)); Olympus Corp. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 911, 913 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3372
(U.S. Nov. 11, 1986) (No. 86-757) ("The American Association of Exporters and
Importers sought to have Customs Service and the Treasury Department eliminate
from the regulations the exemption under section 133.21 (c)(2)."). In Olympus, the
Second Circuit cited a letter from John Walker, Jr., Assistant Secretary (Enforcement and Operations), Department of the Treasury, Senator Paul A. Sarbanes
which stated that "[b]ecause of the legislative and litigative history and longstanding Customs practice on this matter, the Treasury Department has declined to
change this practice by mere regulatory change." See Olympus, 792 F.2d at 317 (citing Letter from John Walker, Jr. to Senator Paul Sarbanes (June 8, 1984)). See also
Affidavit of John G. Partilla, Vice President, Olympus Corp., Olympus Corp. v.
United States, 627 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), afjd, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986),
petitionfor cert.filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3372 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1986) (No. 86-757) (describing
unsuccessful efforts to implore Customs Service to amend 19 C.F.R. § 133.21).
18 19 U.S.C. § 1526(c) (1982). Section 526(c) provides:
Any person dealing in any such merchandise may be enjoined from
dealing therein within the United States or may be required to export or
destroy such merchandise or to remove or obliterate such trademark
and shall be liable for the same damages for wrongful use of a trademark, under the provisions of sections 81 to 109 of Title 15.
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Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946,'g trademark owners have
brought numerous suits against unauthorized third party importers. 20 Furthermore, trademark owners have lobbied strenuosly
against legislative efforts to codify the common control exceptions of 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 as an amendment to section 526.21
In addition to these efforts, trademark owners have commenced declaratory actions against the Customs Service and
other United States government parties to challenge 19 C.F.R.
§ 133.2 1.22 In these actions, the trademark owners contend that
the common control exceptions are contrary to the plain lanId.
19 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982) (original version at ch. 540, § 42, 60 Stat. 440
(1946), re-enacting section 27 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch. 592, § 27, 33
Stat. 730). This section provides in relevant part: "[N]o article of imported merchandise . . . which shall copy or simulate a trade-mark registered in accordance
with the provisions of this Act ... shall be admitted to entry at any customhouse of
the United States." Id.
20 Compare Premier Dental Products v. Darby Supply Co., 794 F.2d 850, 860 (3d
Cir. 1986) and Model Rectifier Corp. v. Takachiho, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 502 (9th
Cir. 1983) (both affirming injunction to permit seizure of unauthorized imports
under section 526(c) of the Tariff Act and section 42 of the Lanham Act) and Weil
Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700, 717 (D.N.J. 1985) and Osawa &
Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (enjoining unauthorized importation of genuine goods under section 526(c) of the Tariff Act and section 42 of the Lanham Act) with NEC Electronics Corp. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 1
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2056, 2060 (9th Cir. 1987) (vacating summary judgment in favor
of trademark owner) and Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo Int'l (Am.) Corp., 707
F.2d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding no trademark infringement).
Cf. Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 909
(D.N.J. 1987) (Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(a), 602(a) (1982) protects
copyright owner against unauthorized importation of goods outside authorized
channels of distribution.).
For a discussion of the inadequacy of private remedy provisions in section
526(c), see Note, The Graying of American Trademarks, supra note 5 at 110-11. For a
discussion of gray goods litigation in other countries, see Takamatsu, ParallelImportation of Trademarked Goods: A Comparative Analysis, 57 WASH. L. REv. 433, 440-52
(1982).
21 See S. 2614, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). See also N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 218-aa
(McKinney 1986) (requiring merchants who sell unauthorized imports to label gray
market goods or post conspicuous notice at point of sale that products sold may not
be warranted by United States trademark owner).
22 See Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United
States, 598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), affrd in
part, reh 'g grantedsub nom. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 56 U.S.L.W. 4219 (U.S. Mar.
7, 1988) (Nos. 86-495, 86-624, 86-625); Vivitar v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
791 (1986); Olympus v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), af'd, 792
F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986),petitionforcert.filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3372 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1986)
(No. 86-757).
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guage of section 526 and therefore cannot stand. 23 Not surprisingly, two prominent "gray marketeers," K Mart Corp. and 47th
Street Photo, Inc., have intervened as defendants alongside the
government or made appearances.24
The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari and
recently heard arguments in one such action, K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc. (K Mart).25 K Mart reaches the Supreme Court on
appeal from a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in United States v. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT), in which that

Court ruled that the common control exceptions of 19 C.F.R.
§ 133.21 contradict the plain languge of section 526 and therefore the regulations are invalid.26 The decision of the District of
Columbia Circuit in K Mart thus conflicts with both a Federal Circuit decision, Vivitar Corp. v. United States,27 and a Second Circuit
decision, Olympus Corp. v. United States.2 8
This comment offers an analytical framework in which to examine the legal issues which face the Court in K Mart. Part II will
trace the legislative history of section 526 and the development
of regulations construing it. Part III will discuss the three recent
decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals. Part IV will
23 See Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks, 790 F.2d at 904; Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1555; Olympus, 792 F.2d at 317.
24 See Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks, 598 F. Supp. at 844;
Olympus, 627 F. Supp. at 922 (both granting motions to intervene to 47th Street
Photo, Inc. and K Mart Corp.); Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1419 (granting motion to
intervene of 47th Street Photo, Inc., and denying motion to intervene of K Mart
Corporation but permitting it to appear as amicus curiae).
25 56 U.S.L.W. 4219 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1988) (Nos. 86-495, 86-624, 86-625), af'g in
part, granting reh 'g to Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v.
United States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In this action, the Supreme Court
granted three petitions for certiorari. See K Mart, 107 S. Ct. 642 (1987), granting
cert. to Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States,
790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Petitions were filed by K Mart Corporation, see
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 642 (1986) (No. 86-495); 47th Street
Photo, Inc., see 47th Street Photo, Inc. v. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of
American Trademarks, 107 S. Ct. 642 (1986) (No. 86-624); and the United States of
America, James A. Baker III, Secretary of the Treasury, and William von Raab,
Commissioner of Customs, see United States v. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity
of American Trademarks, 107 S. Ct. 642 (1986) (No. 86-625). These petitions were
consolidated. 107 S. Ct. at 642. The consolidated action before the Supreme
Court will be referred to hereinafter as K Mart. The District of Columbia District
and Circuit Court decisions from which appeal was taken will be referred to hereinafter as COPIAT.
26 See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 918.
27 761 F.2d at 1552.
28 792 F.2d at 315.
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analyze the arguments advanced in those actions, on which the
Supreme Court will now render a decision in K Mart.
II.

HISTORY OF SECTION

526

AND CUSTOMS SERVICE

REGULATION OF "GRAY GOODS"

A.

Background and Legislative History of Section 526

Prior to the original enactment of section 526 in 1922,29 a
majority of courts held that the Trade-Mark Act of 190530 did not
protect a United States trademark owner against unauthorized
imports of "genuine" goods bearing that mark.3 Because the
1905 Act only prohibited imports which "copy or simulate" a
registered trademark, courts found no illegality when a third
party imported foreign-made goods bearing a mark which had
been applied legitimately by a foreign trademark owner. 2 Under
the universality theory of trademarks, courts failed to recognize
the United States trademark owner as the domestic source of
goods bearing a particular mark, and therefore ruled that "genuine" imports did not confuse or deceive the public as to a product's ultimate source. 3
29 Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 526, 42 Stat. 858, 975 (current version at 19
U.S.C. § 1526 (1982)).
30 Ch. 592, § 27, 33 Stat. 724, 730 (1905) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1124
(1982)). See supra note 19 for text of section 27.
31 See e.g., Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening, 238 F. 780, 782 (2d Cir. 1916);
HunyadiJanos v. Stoeger, 285 F. 861, 864 (2d Cir. 1922) (both permitting importation of trademarked goods by unauthorized third parties on theory that genuine
goods do not "copy or simulate" within meaning of Trade-Mark Act of 1905). Both
Gretsch, 238 F. at 781, and HunyadiJanos, 285 F. at 864, cite Apollinaris Co. v.
Scherer, 27 F. 18, 21 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886), which held that unauthorized importation of "genuine" trademarked goods was not trademark infringement.
32 See Gretsch, 238 F. at 782. The Gretsch court stated:
The obvious purpose [of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905] is to protect the
public and to prevent any one from importing goods identified by their
registered trade-mark which are not genuine. In this case, however, the
imported goods were the genuine articles identified by the trade-mark.
We ... are of opinion that [the trademark] is not infringed by one who
buys in Germany the genuine article identified by the trade-mark, imports it into the United States, and sells it so marked here.
Id.
33 See id. at 781-82. In like manner, the Apollonaris court stated:
[T]he defendant is selling the genuine water, and therefore the trademark is not infringed. There is no exclusive right to the use of a name
or symbol or emblematic device except to denote the authenticity of the
article with which it has become identified by association. The name has
no office except to vouch for the genuineness of the thing which it distinguishes from all counterfeits; and until it is sought to be used as a
false token to denote that the product or commodity to which it is ap-
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34
Consistent with this reasoning, in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied
Trade-Mark Act protection to an independent domestic corporation against an unauthorized third party importer.3 5 In Katzel, A.
Bourjois & Co. had purchased the domestic business, trademarks
and good will of a French manufacturer in JAVA, a cosmetic face
powder, and also spent substantial sums to develop independent
good will in this country. 6 When a third party retailer purchased
genuine JAVA abroad and sold it in this country without authorization, A. Bourjois & Co. brought suit under the Trade-Mark
Act. 37 The district court granted a preliminary injunction in
favor of A. Bourjois & Co. 3' The Second Circuit reversed, however, and permitted the third party to import genuine JAVA without the consent of the United States trademark owner.3 9
This ruling was particularly significant in light of its histori-

plied is the product or commodity which it properly authenticates, the
law of trade-mark cannot be invoked.
27 F. at 20.
The Apollonaris decision "influenced judicial opinion in this area for the next
four decades." Coggio, Gordon, and Coruzzi, The History and Present Status of Gray
Goods, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 443, 445 (1986). See also Atwood, supra note 15, at 303.
Atwood explained that "[u]p to this point, trademarks were considered in their
classic sense as legitimately indicating source of origin or producer ....
Competition by third parties ... was viewed by the courts as lawful so long as the trademark
on the imported goods was lawful where applied abroad." Id.
34 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), petitionfor reh'g denied, 275 F. 544, rev'd, 260 U.S.
689 (1923).
35 Id. at 543.
36 See id. at 539-40. A. Bourjois & Co. purchased cosmetic powder in bulk from
the French manufacturer and packaged it in this country in containers which differed from those in which Katzel had purchased the product overseas. Id. A. Bourjois & Co. distributed this product under the name "PoudreJava," while the French
packaged product was called "Poudre de Riz de Java." Id. at 540. The plaintiff's
JAVA packaging also indicated that the product was "Made in France-Packed in
the U.S.A. by A. Bourjois & Co., Inc., of N.Y., Succ'rs in the U.S. to A. Bourjois &
Cie. and E. Wertheimer & Cie." Id. at 540. When the United States Supreme
Court later reversed the Second Circuit, the Court emphasized the fact that A.
Bourjois & Co. became known as the source ofJAVA in this country. See Katzel, 260
U.S. at 691. See also notes 63-65 infra and accompanying text (discussing the
Supreme Court decision).
37 See Katzel, 275 F. at 540. The defendant, Katzel, distributed JAVA in New
York, New Jersey and other states. Id. at 540. Bourjois sought to prevent Katzel
from importing and selling genuine goods bearing the trademark JAVA. Id.
38 See Katzel, 275 F. at 860.
39 See Katzel, 275 F. at 543. Citing Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886) and Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening, 238 F. 780 (2d Cir.
1922), the Second Circuit noted that a trademark indicates the source of goods and
protects the public from confusion. Id. The Second Circuit stated that the public
would not be confused because Katzel's JAVA came from the original source, the
manufacturer, and therefore the trademark had not been infringed. Id. The
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cal context. After World War I, the Alien Property Custodian
had appropriated and sold United States trademarks of German
businesses in this country to various independent American persons or business entities for substantial sums.4" Under the Second Circuit ruling, independent Americans who had acquired
trademarks from the Alien Property Custodian would have been
powerless to prevent a German manufacturer from importing
goods bearing those trademarks after the War.4 ' Concerned that
the Supreme Court might affirm the Second Circuit decision,
trademark owners pursued a legislative remedy while Katzel was
pending before the Court.4 2
The Tariff Act of 1922"3 was before Congress when the Second Circuit rendered its decision in Katzel.4 4 What became section 526 was a non-tariff provision which was added to the Tariff
Act as a "midnight amendment." 4 5 Indeed, section 526 was one
Supreme Court eventually reversed the Second Circuit. See 260 U.S. at 689. See also
notes 63-65 infra and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court decision).
40 See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1562. The Vivitar court recounted that during World
War I the Alien Property Custodian "had seized assets in this country owned by
foreign nationals of enemy countries and had sold them to U.S. interests." Id. at
1562. Numerous large enterprises had been founded on purchases of intellectual
property rights from the Alien Property Custodian, among them the United States
manufacturer of BAYER aspirin. Id. See also COPIA T, 790 F.2d at 911.
41 See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1562. Independent purchasers of German trademarks
"would have been adversely effected by imports of 'genuine' goods from abroad
with the normalization of international relations." Id.
42 See id.
43 See ch. 356, § 526, 42 Stat. 858, 975 (1922) (current version at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1526 (1982)).
44 See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1562-63.
45 See 62 CONG. REC. 11,602 (1922) (statement of Sen. Moses). Expressing dismay over the manner in which the amendment was considered, Senator Moses
stated:
Mr. President, the history of this amendment is interesting. It was written by a lawyer well known in the precincts of the Capitol; it was inserted
in the bill originally, without hearing, upon the votes of four Senators; it
was removed from the bill by a disagreeing vote on the 6th of June,
upon an understanding, as I believed, that if it were taken up again it
should be taken up as a separate measure on its own merits and before
the Committee on Patents, which properly has jurisdiction of the subject
matter. It was put back in the bill among the myriad amendments
brought in by the committee the other morning after their midnight session, and it may be fairly classified now as one of the midnight amendments, like the "midnight judges" of the John Adams administration.
Id.
Section 526 was introduced in the Senate on September 17, 1982. See 62
CONG. REC. 11,383 (1922). It was enacted by Congress four days later on September 21, 1922. See Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 526, 42 Stat. 858, 975.
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of over 4,000 proposed amendments .46 The sum total of legislative history consists of a brief House Conference Report 47 and a
floor debate limited to ten minutes.48
Referring indirectly to Katzel, the House Conference Report
cited "a recent decision of the circuit court of appeals" as impetus for proposed section 526.' 9 The report, however, described
the Second Circuit decision as an import exclusion case, not a
trademark infringement matter.50 As a result, Senators may have
concluded that an import exclusion remedy was necessary to
overrule Katzel, as opposed to amending trademark law to specify
unauthorized importation of genuine goods as trademark infringement. 5 ' The minutes of the floor debate also indicate that
at least one Senator misunderstood the facts of Katzel, stating that
"the very firm which sold" its rights to A. Bourjois & Co. had also
imported the product without authorization.5 2
46 Brief for Federal Petitioners at 23, K Mart Corp v. Cartier, Inc., 56 U.S.L.W.
4219 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1988) (Nos. 86-495, 86-624, 86-625) [hereinafter Brief for Federal Petitioners]. See supra note 25 (discussing consolidation of this action).
47 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1223, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1922).
48 See 62 CONG. REC. 11,602-05 (1922).
49 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1223, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1922).

Explaining

the proposed amendment, the Conference Report read:
A recent decision of the circuit court of appeals holds that existing law
does not prevent the importation of merchandise bearing the same
trade-mark as merchandise of the United States, if the imported merchandise is genuine and if there is no fraud on the public. The Senate
amendment makes such importation unlawful without the consent of the
owner of the American trademark, in order to protect the American
manufacturer or producer; and the House recedes with an amendment
requiring that the trade-mark be owned, at the time of importation, by a
citizen of the United States or by a corporation or association created or
organized within the United States.
Id.
50 See id. See also Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1562-63 (referring to Conference Report's
"mischaracterization" of Katzel); COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 910 ("The report's reference
to Katzel mistakenly identifies it as an import exclusion case.").
51 See Atwood, supra note 15, at 304-05; Note, The Power of an American Trade-.ark
Owner to Prevent the Importation of the Authentic Product Manufactured By a Foreign Company, 64 YALE L.J. 557, 566 n.48 (1955).
52 See 62 CONG. REC. 11,605 (1922) (Statement of Sen. McCumber). Senator
McCumber stated:
[T]he court in a late decision, which I shall not take time to discuss now
because I have not the time, has held that a trade-mark did not protect a
party at all against importations of the articlefrom the veryfirm which sold
it, stating that the trade-mark is simply to indicate the character of the
goods, or the maker, so that we will know what the goods are; and the
courts will not protect the individual.
Id. (statement of Sen. McCumber) (emphasis added). In this statement, Senator
McCumber "incorrectly described Katzel as a case where the firm that sold its American trademark to the plaintiff thereafter itself marketed identically-trademarked
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Despite these inaccuracies, proponents of section 526 stated
repeatedly that this section was designed to prevent fraud and to
protect merely "the property rights of American citizens who
have purchased trademarks from foreigners." ' 5 3 Responding to
numerous questions from other Senators, the proponents
stressed the narrow goals of protecting independent American
trademark purchasers and overruling the Second Circuit decision
in Katzel.
At the same time, one Senator observed that the language of
section 526 could be interpreted more broadly than its proponents appeared to presume.5 4 As time in the debate was about to
expire, Senator Lenroot asked whether the amendment would
permit a foreign manufacturer to assign United States trademark
rights to a domestic subsidiary and invoke section 526 to exclude
imports of genuine goods by a third party.5 5 Time ran out before
goods in the United States." COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 911. On the contrary, in Katzel it
was a third party which imported the allegedly infringing JAVA, not the French
manufacturer. See Katzel, 275 F. at 540.
53 See 62 CONG. REC. 11,603 (1922) (statement of Sen. Sutherland). In response
to one Senator's concern that section 526 might violate international treaty, Senator Sutherland characterized its purpose as follows:
[A]I1 that this paragraph does is to prevent fraud, and I believe that the
Senate is in favor of protecting the property rights of American citizens
who have purchased trade-marks from foreigners, and when these foreigners deliberately violate the property rights of those to whom they
have sold these trade-marks by shipping over to this country goods
under those identical trade-marks.
See id. Indeed, other Senators echoed concern for independent American businesses which had purchased business assets of German entities from the Alien
Property Custodian. See id. at 11,604 (statements of Sen. Simmons and Sen.
Pomerene). Senator McCumber stated that under Katzel a hypothetical purchaser
of a mark such as BAYER for aspirin would be "entirely unprotected" if the German manufacturer imported genuine aspirin bearing that mark. Id. at 11,604
(statement of Sen. McCumber). Describing section 526 as a remedy in that situation, Senator McCumber stated the proposed legislation would "give the opportunity to protect the American purchaser." Id. (statement of Sen. McCumber).
54 See id. at 11,605 (statement of Sen. Lenroot).
55 See id. (statement of Sen. Lenroot). Senator Lenroot remarked:
We will assume that Pears' soap [a hypothetical foreign produced article] . . . is not registered in the United States. It is sold in the general
markets throughout the world, but the makers of Pears' soap desire a
monopoly in the United States. They have American agents who register a trade-mark of Pears' soap here in the United States.
I want to inquire whether any American could purchase Pears' soap
abroad and import it without the written consent of their agent here in
the United States, and if not, why not? There is no fraud, no deceit. It
is the same identical article, with the trade-mark here protecting the
maker of the article.
Id. (statement of Sen. Lenroot).
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the Senator's question could be answered, however, and the deSenate voted in favor of the
bate ended inconclusively. 5 6 The
57
amendment shortly thereafter.
In 1930, the Senate repealed and re-enacted section 526.58
At that time, the Senate considered deleting the Tariff Act's import consent provision with the goal of encouraging trademark
owners to manufacture goods domestically. 59 After two days of
debate, however, the proposal was rejected and section 526 was
reenacted without change. 60
In 1978, section 526 was amended to permit unauthorized
See id. at 11,605. Senator McCumber's initial response to Senator Lenroot's
hypothetical indicates that the Senator either misunderstood the question or chose
to be evasive. Senator McCumber stated:
Mr. President, if there has been no transfer of trade-mark, that presents
an entirely different question. But suppose the trade-mark is owned exclusively by an American firm or corporation. The mere fact of a foreigner having a trade-mark and registering that trade-mark in the
United States, and selling the goods in the United States through an
agency, of course, would not be affected by this provision.
Id. (statement of Sen. McCumber).
Apparently Senator Lenroot was not satisfied with this response and followed
up his initial question:
This is an international trade-mark of Pears' soap, registered here by an
American, with an American domicile. Under it, Pears' soap could not
be bought in the markets of the world and sold here without the written
consent of the Pears Soap Co., or their agent domiciled here in America.
Id. (Statement of Sen. Lenroot).
At that point, time in the debate ran out and the Senate proceeded to vote
without further comment. See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 912. The District of Columbia
Circuit observed that "despite his doggedness Senator Lenroot never got an acceptable answer to his question." Id.
57 See 62 CONG. REC. 11,605 (1922).
58 See Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 526, 46 Stat. 590, 741 (current version at 19
U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982)).
59 See H.R. 2667, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. 172 (1929). A proposed amendment,
which was intended to compel American trademark owners to produce goods domestically, would have deleted the import consent provision in the 1923 Act. This
amendment was rejected by Congress, however. See 71 CONG. REC. 3,873-76
(1929) for the text of the floor debate.
60 See ch. 497, § 526, 46 Stat. at 741.
In enacting the 1930 statute, the Senate debated extensively the effects of foreign relocation of American businesses. See 71 CONG. REC. 3,871-76, 3,889-906,
4,497-98 (1929). There was, in addition, limited discussion of section 526. See id.
at 3872-73. In contrast to the 1922 debate, however, the participants appeared to
interpret section 526 as being intended to prevent trademark infringement. For
example, Senator Reed stated:
At the present time the tariff laws forbid the importation of an article
bearing a trade-mark registered in America unless the owner of that
trade-mark consents in writing to the importation. Obviously the purpose of that provision is to protect the American owner of the trademark against importation of articles which have been stamped without
56
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imports of genuine trademarked goods for personal use.6 At
that time, Congressional review of the statute was limited to
resolving the problem of tourists who travelled overseas and returned with trademarked goods for personal use. 6 2 In other respects, section 526 remains substantially unchanged since 1930.
B.

ContemporaneousJudicial Interpretations

In 1923, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's decision in Katzel.6" In a landmark decision by justice Holmes, the Court recognized that a United States
trademark owner who developed independent good will in this
country should be treated as the domestic source of goods bearing that mark. 6" On this basis, Justice Holmes ruled that Katzel
had infringed the Bourjois trademark even though the goods he
imported were genuine.6 5 In the same year, the Court decided A.
Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge,6 6 extending the Katzel rationale to require the New York customs collector to exclude genuine goods
at the border.6 7 It is significant to note, however, that the Court
based its decisions on the Trade-Mark Act of 1905 without referhis consent. That is all right as a protection of the American owner of
the trade-mark.
Id. at 3,873 (statement of Sen. Reed). Senator George who contested Senator
Reed's proposal to delete import consent provision in section 526, nonetheless
substantially agreed with Senator Reed's interpretation of section 526: "The section, as it exists in the present law, provides means whereby a manufacturer in this
country can register his trademark.., and prevent the importation of merchandise
bearing an infringing trade-mark." Id. at 3,872 (statement of Sen. George).
61 See Customs Procedural Reform and Simplification Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-410, § 21 1(a),(c), 92 Stat. 888, 903 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1526(d)
(1982)).
62 Id. See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 917. The District of Columbia Circuit observed
that: "Congress reconsidered and addressed only the narrow issue of tourists returning to the country with trademarked goods for their personal use." Id.
63 See Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
64 See id. at 692. Justice Holmes observed:
It is said that the trade-mark here is that of the French house and truly
indicates the origin of the goods. But that is not accurate. It is the
trade-mark of the plaintiff only in the United States and indicates in law
* . * that the goods come from the plaintiff although not made by it.
Id.
65 Id.
66 263 U.S. 675 (1923), answering questions certified at, 292 F. 1013 (2d Cir. 1922).
In Aldridge, the Court answered affirmatively the questions of (1) whether unauthorized domestic sale of genuine foreign goods bearing a registered United States
trademark constituted infringement, and (2) whether a customs collector is required to exclude such articles. Id. (citing Katzel, 260 U.S. at 689).
67 Id.
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ence to section 526.68
The first noteworthy judicial assessment of section 526 came
in 1930 in Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Inc.69 In Sturges, a trademark

owner invoked section 526 in refusing to permit an individual to
import for personal use an automobile bearing a trademark
owned by Clark D. Pease, Inc. 70 Holding for the trademark
owner, the Second Circuit declared that section 526 granted
trademark owners an unlimited power to control the importation
of all goods bearing its mark.7 ' Thus, the first court to face the
question squarely held that the plain language of section 526 established a "drastic" rule which provided for no exceptions.72
This decision was effectively overruled, however, when section
526 was amended in 1978 to permit unauthorized importation of
trademarked goods for personal use.7 3
C.

History of Customs Regulations Under Section 526

The Treasury Department's first regulations implementing
section 526, issued in 1923, merely acknowledged that domestic
trademark owners "are entitled to the protection of section 526"
without limiting or further defining the scope of statutory protection." The 1931 regulations following reenactment of section
526 similarly failed to define the scope of statutory protection,
but barred all unauthorized imports unless the United States
trademark owner consented in writing. 75 As in 1923, the regulaSee Katzel, 260 U.S. at 691-92; Aldridge, 263 U.S. at 676.
48 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir. 1931).
Id. at 1036. The plaintiff advanced two arguments with respect to section
526: (1) that an automobile for personal use did not constitute "merchandise"
within the meaning of the statute, and therefore the trademark owner is without
power to block importation; and (2) that section 526 was intended only to overrule
the Second Circuit decision in Katzel and therefore does not empower a trademark
owner to block imports for personal use. Id. at 1036-37. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit decision in Katzel).
71 Sturges, 48 F.2d at 1037.
72 Id. at 1037. Judge Augustus Hand wrote:
By the Tariff Act Congress adopted the policy of protecting the American owners of foreign trade-marks by most drastic means. However
much we may differ with its policy, the wisdom of the legislation is for
the lawmaking body, and we cannot say that the means adopted were
unadapted to the end sought to be attained.
Id. at 1038.
73 See Customs Procedural Reform and Simplification Act, Pub. L. No. 95-410,
92 Stat. 888, 903 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1526(d) (1982)).
74 Customs Regulations of 1923, Art. 475-80 (superceded 1930). See Vivitar, 761
F.2d at 1566; COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 914.
75 See Customs Regulations of 1931, Art. 518(a) (superceded 1936). Article
518(a) provided:
68
69
70
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tions did not distinguish United States trademark owners in foreign goods on the basis of whether or not they were affiliated
with the foreign trademark owner.7 6
In 1936, however, the Customs Service "unveiled a new approach." 7 7 Specifically, the Customs Service merged its provisions governing section 526 and the Trade-Mark Act into one
regulation, and stated that goods barred under section 526 were
deemed to "copy or simulate" for the purposes of that regulation. 78 More importantly, the regulation went on to state that
trademarked goods of foreign manufacture would not be prohibited from importation if the foreign and domestic trademark "are
owned by the same person, partnership, association or corporation.
In this manner, the Customs Service created its first administrative exception to section 526.
"7

Prohibition of entry.-Entry is prohibited of imported merchandise
bearing a genuine trade-mark when such trade-mark is recorded with
the Treasury Department and registered under the trade-mark law of
February 20, 1905, if compliance is had with all provisions of section
526 of the tariff act of 1930, provided the period of protection for such
trade-mark has not expired.
Id.

76 Discussing the 1931 regulations, the Vivitar court noted that "the bar against
goods with 'genuine' marks appears to have been considered at that time, by Customs, to be absolute." 761 F.2d at 1566 (citing Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Inc., 48
F.2d 1035, 1037 (2d Cir. 1931)). Accord COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 914 ("[N]either the
1923 nor the 1931 regulations had recognized any exceptions to the broad mandate of section 526.").
77 See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 914 (discussing T.D. 48,537, 70 Treas. Dec. 336
(1936) (superceded 1953)).
78 See T.D. 48,537, 70 Treas. Dec. 336 (1936) (superceded 1953). Article 518 of
the 1936 regulations provided in relevant part:
(a) Merchandise of foreign or domestic manufacture is prohibited importation when it bears a name or mark which copies or simulates a
trade-mark or trade name entitled to the protection of the Trade-Mark
Act of 1905 or the Trade-Mark Act of 1920, unless such merchandise is
imported by or for the account of, or with the written consent of, the
owner of the protected trade-mark or trade name.

(b) A name or mark .

.

. on an article of foreign manufacture identical

with a trade-mark or trade name protected by the trade-mark laws of the
United States ...

shall be deemed for the purposes of these regulations

to copy or simulate such protected trade-mark or trade name.
Id.
79 See id. Article 518(b) continued: [M]erchandise manufactured or sold in a
foreign country under a trade-mark or trade name, which trade-mark or trade name
is... recorded under the trade-mark laws of the United States, shall not be deemed
for the purposes of these regulations to copy or simulate such United States trademark or trade name if such foreign trade-mark or trade name and such United
States trade-mark or trade name are owned by the same person, partnership, association, or corporation.
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In 1953, the Customs Service significantly broadened its exemption from import prohibition to deny protection whenever
the United States and foreign trademark were owned by either
The 1953 regulations
the same or a "related company.""
referred to the Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 194681 to define
"related company," 82 a term encompassed licensees as well as
other affiliated companies. 83 Under these regulations, a trademark owner who sought protection under section 526 was required to disclose its possible related company status to the
Customs Service. 4
It is significant to note that the Customs Service declined to
articulate an official policy basis for the administrative exceptions
in either its 1936 or 1953 regulations.8 5 Correspondence indicates, however, that the Customs Service issued its regulations
on the theory that Congress enacted section 526 merely to prevent fraud against independent trademark purchasers such as the
plaintiff in Katzel, and not to insulate affiliated manufacturers and
distributors from competition.8 6 In 1954, legislation was introduced to effectively codify the 1953 regulations on the basis of
8 7
The bill failed to win Congresthese policy considerations.
88
however.
sional approval,
A development which precipitated subsequent regulatory
change occurred in 1957, when the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York rendered its controversial
decision in United States v. Guerlain."9 In Guerlain, the government
brought antitrust actions against three perfume distributors who
80 See 19 C.F.R. § 11.14 (1953), T.D. 53,399, 88 Treas. Dec. 383-84 (1953)
(superceded 1959).
81 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982) (original version at ch. 540 § 42, 60 Stat. 440
(1946)).
82 The Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946 defines a "related company" as "any
person who legitimately controls or is controlled by the registrant or applicant for
registration in respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services in connection with which the mark is used." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982).
83 See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1566.
84 See Atwood, supra note 15, at 310.
85 See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 914 (discussing Customs Service's failure to articulate policy basis for regulatory changes).
86 See Letter From Frank Dow, Commissioner of Customs, to Senator Paul H.
Douglas (March 23, 1951).
87 See S. 2540, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1954); H.R. 9476, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess.
(1954). The language of the 1954 bill "closely parallel[ed]" 19 C.F.R. 133.21. See
COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 915.
88 See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 915 (discussing defeat of S.2540 in 1954).
89 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), prob. juris, noted, 355 U.S. 937, vacated and
remanded, 358 U.S. 915 (1958), dismissed, 172 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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were subsidiaries of parent French manufacturers. 9' The government contended, and the district court ruled, that the distributormanufacturer combination constituted an international enterprise under section 2 of the Sherman Act. 9 ' Furthermore, the
court held that such an enterprise violated antitrust law by invoking section 526 to effectively monopolize a relevant market of
92
genuine goods bearing particular marks.
Following its lower court victory, however, the Justice Department moved to vacate the Southern District decision. 93

Believing that Congress was "best equipped" to deal with the issue, the Justice Department stated it would attempt to persuade
Congress to bar application of section 526 in the case of international enterprises. 94 The Senate considered this proposal as well
as full scale repeal of section 526, but both efforts proved
unsuccessful. 95
90 See 155 F. Supp. at 79. The Department of Justice filed complaints against
Guerlain, Inc., Parfums Corday, Inc., and Lanvin Parfums, Inc., which were consolidated for trial. See id. In the Guerlain case, the domestic entity was a wholly owned
subsidiary of the parent French manufacturer. Id. at 89. In the Corday action, the
domestic entity owned 750 of 800 voting shares of stock in the French manufacturer. Id. at 93. In the Lanvin case, the American entity's continued trademark
ownership was contingent upon the continued tenure of Mr. Eduoard L. Cournard
as chief executive officer. Id. at 96. In addition, the French entity in the Lanvin
action had assigned its United States trademarks subject to the condition that the
American entity must "conduct all of its merchandising in a manner satisfactory to
French Lanvin." Id.
91 Id. at 79 (citing the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982)). Section 2 of the
Sherman Act provides: "Every person who shall monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several [s]tates, or with foreign nations,
shall be deemed to be guilty of a felony ......
Id.
92 See Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. at 85-87.
93 See Appellee's Motion to Vacate at 1, Guerlain, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S.
915 (1958) (Nos. 24, 30, 31). Following the government's motion, the district court
decision was vacated and remanded by the United States Supreme Court. 358 U.S.
at 915. The district court subsequently dismissed the action. 172 F. Supp. at 107.
94 See Appellee's Motion to Vacate, Guerlain, Inc. v. United States, 315 U.S. 915
(1958) (Nos. 24, 30, 31). The Department ofJustice reasoned:
[I]t appears desirable, in the circumstances here present, that the intragovernmental conflict as to the meaning of the tariff or trademark laws
of the United States be resolved, if such resolution can be practicably
achieved, through other means than antitrust litigation....
...The problem which is central to this litigation will thus be laid
before the branch of government, the legislative, which is best equipped
to deal with it in all its ramifications.
Id. at 7-8.
95 See Celler Bill, H.R. 7234, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). For authoritative and
opposing discussions of the Celler Bill, compare Derenberg, Current Trademark
Problems in Foreign Travel and the Import Trade: A CriticalAnalysis of the Purpose, Scope
and Effect of H. R. 7234, 49 TRADEMARK REP. 674 (1959) and Vandenburgh, The Prob-
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In response to the legislature's failure to act following Guerlain, the Customs Service deleted its "related company" exception.96 As a result, only goods bearing domestic and overseas

trademarks owned by the "same company" would not be stopped
at the border by customs. 97 Thus, after 1959 fewer imports fell
within administrative exceptions to section 526 than had between
1953 and 1959, but the scope of exemptions was still significantly
broader than it had been between 1936 and 1953.98

It soon became apparent, however, that a "same company"
domestic affiliate of a foreign corporation could simply alter its
corporate structure to that of a "related company" and thereby
enjoy full protection under section 526. 9 To remedy this and
other problems, Congress again considered repeal of section 526
in 1968 as part of a proposed amendment to the Lanham TradeMark Act.' 0 0 When this effort failed, however, and it appeared
that legislative action would not be forthcoming, in 1972 the
Customs Service issued the regulations which remain in force today.'' The current regulations retain the same entity exception
which has been in effect since 1936102 and also append specific
exemptions for parent/subsidiary corporations and other common owners such as foreign licensees.'0 3
Again, Customs Service articulated no policy rationale for
changing its regulations under section 526 in 1972.104 Correlem of Importation of Genuinely Marked Goods Is Not a Trademark Problem, 49 TRADEMARK
REP. 707 (1959). See also Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F.
Supp. 1063,1078 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (discussing proposed repeal of section 526), vacatedon other grounds, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983); Atwood, supra note 15, at 306-07.
96 19 C.F.R. § 11.14 (1969), T.D. 54,932, 94 Treas. Dec. 433-34 (1959)
(superceded 1972). See also Atwood, supra note 15, at 310.
97 See Atwood, supra note 15, at 310.
98 See id. at 314. Referring to the years between 1959 and 1968, Atwood
observed:
The Bureau's position has consistently been midway between the outright condemnation of all affiliates sought by the Justice Department [in
Guerlain], and outright protection for any American corporation registering a trademark with the United States Patent Office, regardless of
whether common ownership or control existed with any foreign firm, as
a superficial reading of the statute might indicate.
Id.
99 See Atwood, supra note 15, at 314-15.
100 See S. 3713, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 114 CONG. REC. 19,446 (1968). See generally
Atwood, supra note 15. Atwood wrote as S.3713 was pending before the Senate.
101 See 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(a)-(c)(1986). See supra notes 3-4 for the text of these
sections.
102 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1).
103 Id. § 133.21(c)(2).
104 See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 915.
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spondence indicates that the 1972 regulations reflect the
agency's understanding that section 526 was not intended to protect affiliated entities." 5 Other letters suggest, moreover, that
the 1972 changes were based in part on a desire to effectuate the
Guerlain antitrust rationale.'0 6 Significantly, however, in 1983 the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice stated that the
legislative history of section 526 did not support the Customs
Service's interpretation of the statute insofar as it was based on
considerations of antitrust law. 10 7 Thus, the policy basis for 19
C.F.R. § 133.21 appears to be grounded in the Customs Service's
interpretation of the legislative history of section 526.
III.

RECENT ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS

A.

Overview

The United States Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in
K Mart 108 was precipitated by conflict between three circuit

courts of appeal, the highest courts yet to rule on declaratory
challenges to the common control exceptions of 19 C.F.R.
§ 133.21.109 Significantly, in 1985 the Supreme Court had de-

nied a petition for certiorari raising the same legal issues." 0 The
split of authority which has since arisen between Vivitar, COPIA T,
and Olympus, however, will now be addressed by the highest
court. 1' 1
Factually and procedurally, the three recent actions parallel
105 See id., at 916 (citing Letter from Walker B. Comegys, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, to Miles J. Ambrose, Commissioner of Customs
(April 19, 1971)).
106 See id. (citing Letter from Donald T. Regan, Treasury Secretary, to Senator
Dennis DeConcini (Dec. 23, 1983)).
107 See Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co.
v. Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983) (No. 82-7857). In its amicus brief,
the Antitrust Division of the Department ofjustice observed that "neither the legislative reports nor the congressional debate contain any clear evidence of a legislative intent to deny trademark protection where the owner of the U.S. mark is owned
or controlled by the foreign manufacturer of the trademarked goods." Id.
108 See 107 S. Ct. 642 (1986). See supra note 25 (discussing consolidation of this

action).
109 Compare COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 903 with Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1552 and Olympus,
792 F.2d at 315.
110 See Vivitar, 106 S. Ct. 791, denying cert. to, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
111 See K Mart, 107 S. Ct. 642 (1986), granting cert. to 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir.

1986).
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one another precisely." 12 Each action was commenced by United
States trademark owners in foreign made goods who are affiliated
with their products' overseas manufacturer."' In each instance,
the Customs Service had refused to seize unauthorized third
party imports of goods bearing the plaintiffs' marks under the
common control exceptions of 19 C.F.R. § 133.21.114
Pursuing legal redress, these plaintiffs commenced declaratory actions seeking to invalidate 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 as contrary
to the plain language of section 526.15 The defendants in each
action included the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury
and the Customs Service." 6 The government defendants were
joined in each action by interested "gray marketeers" as intervenor-defendants. 1 7 Numerous 8other interested parties also appeared as friends of the court.''
112

315.

See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1552; COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 903; Olympus, 792 F.2d at

1 13 In Vivilar, the plaintiff was a California corporation and owner of the registered trademark VIVITAR. 761 F.2d at 1556. Vivitar Corporation markets and
distributes photographic equipment in this country and abroad. Id. Equipment
bearing the mark VIVITAR is manufactured to Vivitar's specification "by various
foreign manufacturers, principally in Japan." Id.
In COPIA T, the lead plaintiff was a trade association of United States corporations which own registered United States trademarks in foreign goods. 790 F.2d at
904. Most COPIAT members are affiliated with foreign manufacturers, though
some large American corporations with overseas manufacturing facilities are also
members. See Public Comments of COPIAT, supra note 6, at 3 (listing COPIAT
membership). In addition, three COPIAT members joined in the complaint:
Cartier, Inc., Charles of the Ritz Group Ltd., and Waterford Crystal, Inc. See Joint
Appendix at 1, K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 56 U.S.L.W. 4219 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1988)
(Nos. 86-495, 86-624, 86-625).
In Olympus, the plaintiff was a wholly owned subsidiary of Olympus Optical Co.,
Ltd., a Japanese corporation which manufacturers photographic equipment. 792
F.2d at 317. The Olympus Corporation owned a federal registration of the trademark OLYMPUS for photographic equipment. Id.
114 Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1555; COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 904; Olympus, 792 F.2d at 316.
115 See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1555; COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 904; Olympus, 792 F.2d at
316.
116 In Vivitar, the plaintiff initially sued only the United States. 585 F. Supp. at
1415. In COPIA T and Olympus, the plaintiffs brought suit against the United States,
the Commissioner of Customs, William von Raab, and the Secretary of Treasury,
Donald T. Regan. See COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 846; and Olympus, 627 F. Supp. at
913.
117 In Vivitar, the lower court granted a motion to intervene to 47th Street Photo,
Inc. under F.R.C.P. Rule 24(a) (intervention of right), or in the alternative, under
F.R.C.P. Rule 24(b) (permissive intervention), but denied a similar motion to K
Mart Corporation. 585 F. Supp. at 1418-19. K Mart Corporation and 47th Street
Photo, Inc., were both permitted to intervene as defendants in COPIAT and Olympus. See COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 846; Olympus, 627 F. Supp. at 916.
1 18 In Vivitar, the Federal Circuit accepted amicus briefs from Olympus Corporation, Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks, American Free
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The JurisdictionalQuestion

As a threshold issue, each circuit court addressed whether
the trial court had properly assumed subject matter jurisdiction." 9 In Vivitar, the plaintiff had commenced its action in the
Court of International Trade (CIT),' 120 a court with exclusive ju21
risdiction over limited, statutorily prescribed subject matter.'
Rejecting the government's motion to dismiss for want of subject
matter jurisdiction, the CIT ruled that it possessed exclusive jurisdiction over a declaratory action seeking to invalidate 19
C.F.R. § 133.21.122 This ruling was affirmed by the Federal Circuit, 12 but disputed by25 both district and circuit courts in
COPIA T ' 24 and Olympus. 1
The CIT reasoned that regulating importation of genuine
trademarked goods does not involve trademark infringement but
rather "is uniquely a concern of international trade law." 126 In
support of its position, the CIT read broadly two specific grants
of jurisdiction in the Customs Courts Act of 1980.127 First, the
CIT found power to hear the action as a corollary to the grant of
jurisdiction in section 1581 (a) over protests by importers against
the Customs Service for alleged wrongful exclusion of imported
goods. 12 8 Second, the CIT ruled that section 1581(i)(3) granted
Trade Association, The National Association of Catalog Showroom Merchandisers,
Progress Trading Company, Inc., K Mart Corporation and the Association of General Merchandise Chains, Inc. 761 F.2d at 1555 n.2. In COPIAT, the District of
Columbia Circuit accepted amicus briefs from Progress Trading Company, American Free Trade Association, and four American consumers (Messrs. Andy Shafer,
Herbert Silver, Harry Hersios, and Charles L. Linahan). See Brief for Appellants at
1, Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States, 790
F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (No. 84-5890), aff'd in part, reh 'g granted sub nom. K Mart
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 56 U.S.L.W. 4219 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1988) (Nos. 86-495, 86-624,
86-625).
119 See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1557-60; COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 905-07; Olympus, 792
F.2d at 317-19.
120 See Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1415.
121 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1980). See infra note 128 (discussing jurisdiction of the CIT).
122 See Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1427. For further discussion of this ruling, see
notes 122-25 infra and accompanying text. See also infra notes 179-204 and accompanying text.
123 Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1560.
124 See COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 847, aft'd, 790 F.2d at 907.
125 See Olympus, 627 F. Supp. at 914, aff'd, 792 F.2d at 319.
126 Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1423.
127 See Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1425 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1982).
128 Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1425. Section 1581 (a) provides: "The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced to
contest the denial of a protest, in whole or in part, under section 515 of the Tariff
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it power over issues relating to an embargo or "other quantitative restriction." 129
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that hearing a declaratory action would clearly have exceeded the power of the CIT's
predecessor, the United States Customs Court. 3 0 In the Customs Courts Act of 1980, however, Congress intended "to consolidate jurisdiction over suits against the government in
international trade matters" into one court. 13 1 With this in mind,
the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT's two statutory bases for
jurisdiction. 132
Before the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT in Vivitar, two
district courts, COPIA T and Olympus, had rejected the CIT's claim
to exclusive jurisdiction.13 3 When COPIAT and Olympus reached
the Court of Appeals, the Second Circuit and District of Columrulings
bia Circuit both affirmed their lower courts' jurisdictional
34
and disagreed explicitly with the Federal Circuit.
In COPIAT and Olympus, the circuit courts recognized that
the Customs Courts Act of 1980 had conferred jurisdiction on
Act of 1930." 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982). Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) provides in relevant part:
In addition to the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of International
Trade by subsections (a)-(h) of this section, . . .the Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced against the United States, its agencies, or its officers, that arises
out of any law of the United States providing for
(4) the administration and enforcement with respect to the matters referred to in .. .subsections (a)-(h) of this section.
Id.
Judge Restani observed that "legislative history makes clear that Congress intended in § 1581(i)(4) to give [the CIT] broad residual jurisdiction over cases arising out of the administration and enforcement of substantive international trade
law that is also the subject matter of the more specific jurisdictional provisions in
section 1581." Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1425. On this basis, Judge Restani read
subsections 1581(a) and (i)(4) together, and ruled that a declaratory challenge to
regulations which permit non-enforcement fell within the statutory grant ofjurisdiction, even though no "protest" had actually occurred. Id. at 1424-25.
129 Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1426. Section 1581(i)(3) grants the CIT exclusive jurisdiction over "embargoes and other quantitative restrictions on the importation
of merchandise for reasons other than the protection of public health or safety."
28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3) (1982). Judge Restani reasoned that section 526 fell within
the ambit of this provision because "it outlaws the importation of all trademarked
goods under certain circumstances." 585 F. Supp. at 1426.
130 Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1560.
131 Id.
132 Id. See supra notes 127-28 (discussing specific jurisdictional grants).
133 See COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 847; Olympus, 627 F. Supp. at 914.
134 See COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 847; Olympus, 627 F. Supp. at 914.
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the CIT in the areas specifically enumerated in section 1581.'35
Both courts observed, however, that the Federal Circuit had construed that section too liberally. 13 6 Specifically, the COPIAT and
Olympus courts noted that section 1581(a) establishes the CIT as
an exclusive forum for protests by importers against alleged
wrongful exclusion of foreign goods. 1 37 The courts both declared, however, that the section did not apply to the facts before
1 38
them because no such exclusion had taken place.
As to the Vivitar court's position on "embargo" jurisdiction,
the COPIA T and Olympus courts ruled that the Federal Circuit had
again read the Customs Courts Act too liberally.' 3 9 Expressing a
view which was later restated in Olympus, the COPIAT court posited that "the statute belies any expansive reading of 'embargo.' '"140 Rather, the COPIAT court declared, sections
1581(i)(2) and (i)(3) were intended to confer CIT jurisdiction
over import restrictions on the price or quantity of imported
goods, not exclusion of genuine trademarked goods.' 4 ' For
these reasons, the District of Columbia and Second Circuit
Courts of Appeal held that the lower courts had properly exercised jurisdiction under sections 1331,142 1338(a),' 4 3 and 1121 of
title 28.144
135 See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 905-07; Olympus, 792 F.2d at 318-19.
136

See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 906; Olympus, 792 F.2d at 318.

137 See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 906; Olympus, 792 F.2d at 318.
138 See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 906; Olympus, 792 F.2d at 318. The District of Columbia Circuit noted that "[t]he case before the Vivitar court concerned an American trademark owner's challenge to Customs decision not to exclude the
merchandise in question, and there is no provision for administrative protests by
such interested third parties." COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 906.
139 See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 906-07; Olympus, 792 F.2d at 318-19.
140 COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 907. Accord Olympus, 792 F.2d at 319. In Olympus, the
Second Circuit declared: "To treat section 526 as an 'embargo' would be to give
that term a construction far broader than its ordinary meaning without any indication of such congressional intent." Id.
141 See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 907; accord Olympus, 792 F.2d at 318-19.
142 See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 907; Olympus, 792 F.2d at 319 (both citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1982)). Section 1331 provides: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
143 See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 907; Olympus, 792 F.2d at 319 (both citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a) (1982)). Section 1338(a) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to
patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trade-marks. Such jurisdiction
shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant variety protection and
copyright cases." 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982).
144 See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 907 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1121 (1982)). Section 1121
provides:
Remedies-Jurisdictionof courts. The district and territorial courts of the
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Construction of Section 526

While the circuit courts are divided on the jurisdictional issue, an even wider split has developed on the substantive issue of
the validity of 19 C.F.R. § 133.21. Thus far, while the Federal
Circuit and the Second Circuit have both upheld the challenged
regulation, they have done so for different reasons.' 4 5 Only the
District of Columbia Circuit has declared the regulation invalid,' 4 6 and this is the decision under review before the Supreme
Court.
In Vivitar, the government and gray marketeer defendants
advanced three arguments in support of 19 C.F.R. § 133.21.
First, the government contended that the legislative history of
section 526 indicates that Congress intended the statute to protect only independent American purchasers of foreign trademarks, not related entities.1 4 7 Thus, because 19 C.F.R. § 133.21
merely denies protection to related entity trademark owners, the
defendants argued that the regulation is consistent with the intent of section 526.148 Second, the government urged that 19
C.F.R. § 133.21 reflects a longstanding interpretation of section
526 to which the court should duly defer.' 4 9 Third, the government contended that Congress had implicitly ratified 19 C.F.R.
§ 133.21 by its failure to overrule the regulation in 1975 and
1978 when amendments to section 526 were debated. 5 ' Judge
persuaRestani, writing for the CIT, found all three arguments
51
bases.'
these
on
133.21
§
C.F.R.
sive and upheld 19
United States shall have original jurisdiction and the courts of appeal of
the United States (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit) shall have appellate jurisdiction, of all actions under
this chapter, without regard to the amount in controversy or lack of diversity of citizenship of the parties.
28 U.S.C. § 1121 (1982).
145 See infra notes 152-61, 171-74 and accompanying text.
146 See infra notes 162-70 and accompanying text.
147 See 107 S. Ct. 946 (1986).
148 See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1561.
149 Id.
150 Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 432-33. See also Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1565.
151 Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 436. Judge Restani examined legislative history at
length and concluded that "the purpose of [section 526] was to reverse the Second
Circuit Katzel decision." 593 F. Supp. at 427. Judge Restani noted that the Conference Report accompanying section 526 referred to Katzel. Id. See also supra notes
49-50. Furthermore, "the sponsors made clear [in the legislative debate] that the
purpose of the amendment was to protect an American trademark owner who had
purchased the right to use a trademark from an independent foreign company."
593 F. Supp. at 427. See also supra note 53 (discussing legislative history).
Tracing the history of Customs Service regulation, Judge Restani observed

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 18:55

On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the result of the
CIT, but declined to follow its reasoning.' 52 Judge Nies, writing
for the Federal Circuit, reasoned that the legislative history of
section 526 is too "unfocused and misinformed" to serve as a
definitive basis for statutory interpretation. 153 Furthermore,
Judge Nies stated that Customs Service policy had not been sufficiently consistent to warrant judicial deference.1 54 Finally, Judge
Nies declared that Congress' failure to amend section 526 did
1 55
not support the defendants' implied ratification theory.
Rather, Judge Nies remarked that "legislation by total silence is
too tenuous a theory to merit extended discussion." 156
Judge Nies nonetheless upheld 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 as a reasonable construction of section 526.151 Judge Nies stated because section 526 does not delegate legislative authority to the
Secretary of Treasury, it does not require the Customs Service to
promulgate regulations setting the limits of exclusionary
that "the essential thrust . ..has remained unchanged since 1936." Id. at 429.
Thus, the judge concluded, "this construction is entitled to substantial weight." Id.
at 432. Moreover, Judge Restani declared that "failure to alter [section 526] is
sufficient indication of Congressional acquiescence in Customs' administrative
practice." Id. at 433 (citing Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 301 (1981)).
In response to Vivitar's arguments that 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 permitted gray marketeers to exploit its good will and to "free ride," Judge Restani asserted that such
contentions pose "a problem that [section 526] was not intended to deal with." Id.
at 435. Rather, in view of legislative history, consistency of administrative policy
and Congressional acquiescence, the court recognized 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 as "a
reasonable construction reflecting Congress' intent, and is in fact a necessary construction of the statute to avoid results Congress clearly did not intend." Id. at 434.
152 See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1556.
153 See id. at 1563. Judge Nies observed that overruling the Second Circuit decision in Katzel was merely "one purpose of [section 526] . ..not the sole purpose" as
the lower court had implied. Id. at 1561. RatherJudge Nies declared that "[a]t the
time of enactment, it cannot be disputed that Congress intended [section 526] to
provide an exclusion remedy broader than that in § 27 of the trademark statute
which, as held in Gretsch, was limited by the words 'copy or simulate,' to the barring
of infringements." Id. at 1563 (citing Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening, 238 F.
780, 782 (2d Cir. 1916)).
154 Id. at 1565. Judge Nies opined:
Our review of the series of regulations issued by Customs since 1923,
together with administrative practice, Treasury rulings, and correspondence between various Customs officials and members of Congress, indicates that Customs has had and continues to have changing views of the
role of Customs in enforcing [section 526] on behalf of owners of registered U.S. Trademarks (as well as in enforcing the import exclusion in
the Trademark Acts of 1905 and 1946).
Id.
155 Id. at 1568.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 1569.
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power. 1 58 Rather, Judge Nies observed that due to the "myriad"
variety of gray market disputes, the Customs Service may be
deemed a reasonable interpretation of section 526 by providing
statutory protection to most trademark owners but declinding
enforcement in common control situations, "[w]here protection
under the statute is unclear or depends on the resolution of complex factual situations." 159 When the Customs Service declines
to enforce section 526, Judge Nies stated, parties may litigate
their disputes in the district courts. 160 On this basis, the Federal
Circuit upheld 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 as a reasonable but not definitive interpretation of section 526.161
In COPIA T, the defendants raised the same legal arguments
which were advanced in Vivitar,16 2 and again achieved victory in
the lower court.' 6 3 On appeal, however, the District of Columbia
Circuit determined that 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 "cannot be squared"
1 64
with section 526 and invalidated the regulations on that basis.
Judge Silberman, writing for the District of Columbia Circuit,
stated that deference to an administrative interpretation of a statute is only appropriate when a statute is ambiguous. 165 Since the
language of section 526 is clear on its face, Judge Silberman
ruled that the district court erred in deferring to agency
66
interpretation. 1
In accord with Vivitar, the District of Columbia Circuit found
that the legislative history of section 526 did not provide suffiId. (citing 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.8 (2d ed. 1979)).
159 See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1570.
158

160 Id. The court noted that section 526(c) provides a private remedy to aggrieved trademark owners. Id. See supra note 20 (discussing recent litigation under
section 526(c)).
161 Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1570.
162 See notes 147-51 supra and accompanying text.
163 See 598 F. Supp. at 853.
164 See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 907.
165 Id. at 908 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984)). The Chevron Court stated, "If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
166 See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 908. Judge Silberman opined:
[C]ourts must exercise their independent judgment on the preliminary
question of whether a statute unambiguously expresses congressional
intent on the matter at issue; deference to an agency's interpretation
becomes appropriate where the statute delegates authority to an agency
to give content to flexible statutory terms or contains "gaps" that invite
an agency role in interpretation. ...
In this case, we believe that Congress' intent in section 526 is clear,
and thus "that is the end of the matter."
Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842).
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cient indicia of contrary intent to support an interpretation of the
statute by other than its plain meaning. 1 67 Moreover, the District
of Columbia Circuit found that the Customs Service's interpretation of the statute was inconsistent, and therefore did not warrant
judicial deference. 168 Contrary to Vivitar, however, the District of
Columbia Circuit ruled that 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 could not be upheld as an exercise of enforcement discretion because the Customs Service had never attempted to justify its regulations on
that basis.' 6 9 As a result, the District of Columbia Circuit directed the lower court to170enter declaratory judgment holding 19
C.F.R. § 133.21 invalid.
In Olympus, the Second Circuit presented yet another view on
construction of section 526. Judge Oakes, writing for the Second
Circuit, adopted by reference Judge Restani's discussion in Vivitar of the legislative history of section 526.171 Judge Oakes also
noted the Federal Circuit's account of "[t]he checkered history"
of 19 C.F.R. § 133.21, and indicated that challenged regulation
was "unsound both as antitrust policy and as trademark law." 172
Nonetheless, Judge Oakes maintained that the Customs Service's
interpretation of the statute had indeed been sufficiently consistent to warrant judicial acceptance.' 73 Moreover, Judge Oakes
concluded that "Congressional acquiescence in the longstanding
administrative interpretation of the statute legitimates that interpretation as an exercise of Customs' enforcement discretion." 174
For these reasons, the Second Circuit declined to follow COPIA T.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Winter agreed generally with
the District of Columbia Circuit that neither legislative history
nor consistent administrative practice could support upholding
19 C.F.R. § 133.21.175 The dissent also rejected the Customs
167

See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 913.

168 Id. at 916 (citing Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Cam-

paign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 37 (1981)).
169 Id. at 918 (citing S.E.C. v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)).
170 COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 918.
171 Olympus, 792 F.2d at 319 (citing ivitar, 761 F.2d at 1565-68). See also Vivilar,
593 F. Supp. at 426-28; supra note 148.
172 Olympus, 792 F.2d at 319 (quoting Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp.
1163, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
173 Id.
174 Id. at 320.
175 Id. at 322 (Winter, J., dissenting) (citing COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 910-18). Judge
Winter asserted that "[e]nforcement of section 526 as written is simplicity itself.
Goods of foreign manufacture bearing a trademark owned by a U.S. citizen or firm
must be excluded from the country absent written consent from the owner. Difficulties . . .arise only after determining that section 526 does not exclude all grey
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Service's claim that it would experience administrative difficulties
in enforcing section 526.176 Judge Winter observed that "the
Customs Service has over the years justified this regulation with
arguments of opportunity tailored to whatever audience it happened to be addressing at the time."' 7 7 If legislative acquiescence was essentially an administrative law fiction, he continued,
178
that "does not mean ... we cannot insist on coherent fiction,"
and therefore dissented from the Olympus majority.
IV.

A.

ANALYSIS

The JurisdictionalQuestion

Conceivably, the United States Supreme Court could decline
to rule on the substantive issues of K Mart by overruling the District of Columbia Circuit on jurisdictional grounds. If the District
of Columbia Circuit erred in declining to follow the Federal Circuit ruling that it possessed exclusive subject matter jurisdiction, 7 ' the Supreme Court would not reach the substantive issue
of the validity of 19 C.F.R. § 133.21. As such, the Court would
not render a decision on construction of section 526 until another case reached it through the CIT and Federal Circuit Court
0
of Appeals. 18

As K Mart reaches the United States Supreme Court, it is
significant to note that only intervenor-defendant 47th Street
Photo, Inc. has raised the jurisdictional question.' 8 ' The government defendants have conceded the district court's jurisdiction. 8 2 As the Federal Circuit decision in Vivitar reveals,
however, the jurisdictional question is not as simple as the decisions of the appellate and district courts in COPIA T and Olympus
market goods . . . once [the meaning of section 526 has been resolved] against
excluding grey market goods, however, the validity of the regulation is beyond
challenge." Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.

178 Id.
179 See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 907 (ruling that declaratory action challenging 19
C.F.R. § 133.21 did not fall within the specific provisions of Customs Courts Act of

1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1982)).
180 Address by Scott Gilbert, BrooklynJ. Int'l L. Symposium on Gray Market Goods
(Feb. 19, 1987).
181 See Brief for 47th Street Photo, supra note 12, at 9 (certifying question of
whether CIT has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over declaratory action challenging 19 C.F.R. § 133.21).
182 See Brief for Federal Petitioners, supra note 46, at 2. The government defendants did not raise the jurisdictional question before the Supreme Court. Id.
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might lead one to believe.' 8 3

COPIAT takes the position that the district court's jurisdiction over a declaratory action challenging 19 C.F.R. § 133.21
arises initially under federal question jurisdiction under section
1331 of title 28.184 COPIAT also contends that a district court

has trademark jurisdiction under section 1338(a),1 8 5 as well as ju-

risdiction under the Lanham Act.' 8 6
The jurisdictional statutes cited by COPIAT, however,
merely set forth broad rules and fail to consider that the Customs
Courts Act of 1980187 vested exclusive original jurisdiction in the
CIT over specifically enumerated subject matter. 88 The Customs Courts Act of 1980 clearly intended to enlarge the original
jurisdiction of the nascent CIT beyond that of its predecessor,
the Customs Court.' 89 Whether the 1980 Act can be construed
to have conferred CIT jurisdiction over a declaratory action challenging 19 C.F.R. § 133.21, however, presents another issue.
In accord with the CIT and the Federal Circuit in Vivitar,
47th Street Photo, Inc. contends in K Mart that two specific provisions of the Customs Courts Act divest the district courts of
jurisdiction.190 First, 47th Street Photo asserts that CIT and Federal Circuit jurisdiction may be founded on embargo jurisdiction
Compare Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1557-60 (discussing legislative intent of Customs
Courts Act of 1980 to consolidate in one court jurisdiction over actions against the
government in international trade matters) with COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 905-07 and
Olympus, 792 F.2d at 317-19 (both summarily rejecting jurisdictional bases of
Vivitar).
184 See Brief for Respondents at 13, K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 56 U.S.L.W.
4219 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1988) (Nos. 86-495, 86-624, 86-625) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1982)) [hereinafter Brief for COPIAT]. See supra note 25 (discussing consolidation
of this action).
185 Brief for COPIAT, supra note 184, at 13 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982)).
186 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1982)).
187 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1982). See supra note 128 for the text of relevant sections of
this statute.
188 See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1558-59.
189 See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 905. Judge Nies stated that the Customs Courts Act
of 1980 "divests the district courts of some of their pre-existing jurisdiction." Id.
(citing Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1559-60). The Vivitar court further noted that before
enactment of the Customs Courts Act of 1980, "there is no question that a federal
district court was the forum for a trademark owner [suing under section 526] to
pursue any claim for exclusion, whether against the government or a private party."
761 F.2d at 1560. For a discussion of CIT jurisdiction, see Amerine,Jurisdiction of
the Court of International Trade: One Year After the Customs Courts Act of 1980, 29 FED. B.
NEWS &J. 43 (1982).
190 See Brief for 47th Street Photo, supra note 12, at 9-19.
183
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under section 1581(i)(3). 9 l Second, 47th Street Photo argues
that the CIT is vested with jurisdiction as a corollary to protest
jurisdiction under sections 1581(a) and (i).' 02
47th Street Photo's protest jurisdiction argument appears to
have little merit. Section 1514 of the Tariff Act 9 3 outlines the
circumstances under which a protest against the Customs Service
may be filed, which typically involve disputes over whether particular articles may be permitted to enter the country.'9 4 19 C.F.R.
§ 133.21, on the other hand, states that the Customs Service may
refuse to block importation in certain circumstances. 9 5 As the
District of Columbia Circuit observed, COPIAT takes issue with
the Customs Service's failure to exclude genuine goods, which is
not a protestable exclusion. 19 6 Thus, where a protest is unavailable, it is questionable that the grant of residual jurisdiction under
section 1518(i)(4) for "administration and enforcement" of protests establishes the Court of International Trade's
7
9
jurisdiction. 1

A more difficult question is raised by 47th Street Photo's assertion that the import prohibitions of section 526 constitute an
embargo or quantitative restriction on importation. In this regard, 47th Street Photo contends that the remedy sought by
COPIAT and other trademark-owner plaintiffs is a nondiscretionary exclusion which "is functionally equivalent to em191 See id. at 10-17 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581(a) and (i) (1982)). See supra note 128
for text of 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), (i).
192 See Brief for 47th Street Photo, supra note 12, at 17-19 (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(i)(3) (1982)). See supra note 128 for text of § 1581(i)(3).
193 See 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(4) (1982). This section provides for protests against
"the exclusion of merchandise from entry or delivery or a demand for redelivery to
customs custody under any provision of the customs laws ......
Id.
194 See Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1424. Judge Restani noted that § 1514(a)(4)
"makes it clear that a decision not to exclude merchandise is not protestable." Id.
195 See supra notes 3-4 for text of 19 C.F.R. § 133.21.
196 See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 906. The District of Columbia Circuit observed that,
"The case before the Vivitar court concerned an American trademark owner's challenge to Customs' decision not to exclude the merchandise in question, and there is
no provision for administrative protests by such interested third-parties." Id.
197 See id. Discussing the "protest jurisdiction" question, the District of Columbia
Circuit stated that "[b]ecause no right to protest arises from Customs' admission of
goods-in contrast to its exclusion of goods-in such cases there is no administration and enforcement of ... (protests)." Id. Accord Olympus, 792 F.2d at 317-18.
But see Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1560. The Vivitar court observed that "where the subject
matter is the validity of regulations or of procedures thereunder, a protest is appropriate and therefore, the denial thereof falls within the jurisdictional grant of 28
U.S.C. § 1581(a)." Id. (citing Lois Jeans &Jackets, U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 566
F. Supp. 1523 (1983)).
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bargo." 198 Adopting this position, the Federal Circuit noted that
one Senator characterized section 526 as an embargo during legislative debate in 1922.199
As the Olympus court noted, however, the term "quantitative
restriction" typically refers to trade restrictions or import quotas,
which are distinguishable from the restrictions of section 526.200
Moreover, the word "embargo" usually connotes a politically
motivated ban on importation of goods from a particular country
or individual, not a mere import restriction. 20 1 Thus, the Olympus
and COPIAT courts correctly rejected the assertion that the CIT
retained exclusive subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of section 1581(i)(3).202
Because the Customs Courts Act of 1980 does not remove
original jurisdiction of the district court, the district court retains
20 4
federal question jurisdiction 20

'

and trademark jurisdiction.

For these reasons, the United States Supreme Court has solid
grounds for affirming the jurisdictional ruling of COPIA T.
B.

The Substantive Issue: Statutory Construction
The substantive issue before the Supreme Court of the

198 See Brief for 47th Street Photo, Inc. at 15, Olympus Corp. v. United States,
792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986) (No. 85-6282). See also Elliott, A Mixture of Reality and
Incoherent Fictions: A Study of Gray on Gray 22-24 (August 24, 1986) (unpublished manuscript) (available in the files of THE SETON HALL LAW REVIEW). Elliott
argues that the provisions of section 526 establish an import prohibition which, he
claims, is a species of embargo. Id. Elliott contends in the alternative that section
526 establishes a total quantitative restriction of unauthorized imports bearing
trademarks owned by United States citizens or corporations. Id. at 23.
199 See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1560 n.9 (citing 62 CONG. REC. 11,603 (1922) (statement of Sen. Kellogg)).
200 See Olympus, 792 F.2d at 319. The Olympus court stated that "[w]e think quantitative restrictions refer to numerical import restrictions such as those imposed by
quotas." Id. (citing American Ass'n of Exporters & Importers v. United States, 751
F.2d 1239, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
201 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 468 (5th ed. 1979). Embargo is defined as:
A proclamation or order of government, usually issued in time of war or
threatened hostilities, prohibiting the departure of ships or goods from
some or all ports until further order. Government order prohibiting
commercial trade with individuals or businesses of other nations. Legal
prohibition on commerce.
The temporary or permanent sequestration of the property of individuals for the purposes of a government, e.g., to obtain vessels for the
transport of troops, the owners being reimbursed for this forced service.
Id.
202 See Olympus, 792 F.2d at 318-19; COPIAT,792 F.2d at 906-07.
203 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
204 See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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United States is whether the common control exceptions of 19
C.F.R. § 133.21 may be upheld in spite of their apparent conflict
with section 526.205 The Supreme Court stated that judicial review of statutory construction by an administrative agency requires a two-part inquiry.20 6 First, a court should determine
whether Congress has addressed directly the precise question at
issue. 20 7 If Congress has spoken on an issue clearly and without
ambiguity, "that is the end of the matter.

' 20 8

The agency and

the reviewing court must give effect to Congress' express intent. 22009 If Congress has not directly confronted a particular
question, however, a court should examine the reasonableness of
the agency's construction. 210 This section will analyze numerous
positions which have been advocated before the Supreme Court
in K Mart.

1. Legislative History and the Plain Meaning
of Section 526
COPIAT advocates that the language of section 526 is clear
and unambiguous and therefore the Supreme Court should give
effect to its plain meaning.2 1 ' The necessary result of that construction would be to affirm the decision of the District of Columbia Circuit and to declare 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 invalid. COPIAT
contends that absent ambiguity or clearly expressed indication to
the contrary, a court must deduce legislative intent from the statutory language. 2 12

COPIAT contends that section 526 estab-

lishes a simple rule under which recording a registered
trademark with the Secretary of the Treasury requires the Customs Service to prevent the unauthorized importation of foreignSee COPIAT, 107 S. Ct. at 642.
Chevron USA, Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 842-43.
Id. at 843.
See Brief for COPIAT, supra note 184, at 19-22.
See Brief for COPIAT, supra note 184, at 19-22 (citing Amoco Production Co.
v.Village of Gambell, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 1406 (1987); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107
S. Ct. 1207, 1213 n.12 (1987); Board of Governors v. Dimension Finance Corp.,
474 U.S. 361, 368 (1986); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985)). Accord
COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 908 (citing Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70 (1984); Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 n.29 (1978); Eagle-Picher Indus.,
Inc. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 922, 929-30 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). See also Consumer Products
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). See generally E.
CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 164 (1940) ("[B]efore the court can
resort to any other source for assistance, it must first seek to find the legislative
intention from words, phrases and sentences which make up the statute.").
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
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made goods bearing that mark.213 With this in mind, COPIAT
maintains that the common control exceptions contained in 19
C.F.R. § 133.21 have the effect of amending section 526 and
therefore cannot be sustained.21 4
The government and gray marketeer petitioners take the position that it is inappropriate to look solely to the language of
section 526 in addressing COPIAT's challenge to 19 C.F.R.
§ 133.21 because the legislative history indicates that "Congress
has not addressed the precise question at issue."' 2 15 The peti-

tioners maintain that in enacting section 526 Congress intended
merely to resolve a narrow problem: the protection of independent trademark purchasers such as the plaintiff in Katzel.2 16 They
contend that Congress did not intend to provide "a mechanism
to help foreign or multinational firms enforce exclusive U.S. dis213 Brief for COPIAT, supra note 184, at 19. See supra note 2 for the text of section 526.
214 Brief for COPIAT, supra note 184, at 19-20. COPIAT compared 19 C.F.R.
§ 133.21 to the regulations challenged in Burlington Northern R.R. v. Oklahoma
Tax Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 1855 (1987). Id. at 20. COPIAT notes that in Burlington
Northern, the Court ruled that to sustain the regulations in question "would require
amendment rather than construction of the statute." Id. (quoting Burlington Northern, 107 S. Ct. at 1861).
215 See Brief for Federal Petitioners, supra note 46, at 11-12 (quoting Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). The Federal Petitioners
cited numerous recent decisions in which the Court has narrowly construed statutes
on the theory that relevant legislative history indicated Congress did not intend the
enactment to apply in all situations as a literal reading of plain language might
suggest. Id. at 12-13 (citing California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107
S. Ct. 683 (1987); FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., No. 84-1972, slip op. at 5-6
(May 27, 1986); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981)). The Federal Petitioners
elaborated that "circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation may persuade a court that Congress did not intend words of common meaning to have their
literal effect." Id. at 12 (citing Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. at 266). The petitioners
also stated that it is a "familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the
intention of its makers." Id. (citing Guerra, at 691 (citations omitted)).
216 Brief for Federal Petitioners, supra note 46, at 13-31. The Federal Petitioners
cite statements from the Senate floor debate in which "proponents repeatedly assured their fellow senators that section 526 was intended to serve the limited purpose of protecting Americans who purchased U.S. trademark rights from foreign
trademark owners." Id. at 18. See also supra note 53 (discussing legislative history).
The Federal Petitioners also referred to the inconclusive colloquy between Senators Lenroot and McCumber as time in the debate was about to expire. Brief for
Federal Petitioners, supra note 46, at 22-23. See also supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (discussing this exchange). The Federal Petitioners concluded that:
"Congress did not (indeed, could not) give careful attention to every potential ramification of that floor amendment. Instead, it relied on the sponsors, who maintained that section 526 was designed to provide special protection to Americans
who purchased U.S. rights from foreign trademark owners." Brief for Federal Petitioners, supra note 46, at 23-24.
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tribution arrangements. "217 Rather, the petitioners attribute the
concededly broad language of section 526 to "hasty drafting
rather than a conscious intent to prevent importation of U.S.
trademarked goods in every instance. ' 218 For these reasons,
they submit the Court should adopt a limited interpretation of
section 526.219

The legislative history of section 526 reflects a senario of
haste, misinformation, and miscommunication. As noted above,
the floor debate was brief 220 and the Conference Report may
have been inaccurate. 22 ' Even one of the amendment's vocal
supporters misunderstood the events which gave rise to its introduction.222 Moreover, an important question on the scope of the
2 23
amendment remained unanswered as time for debate ran out.
Despite this murky legislative history, it is nonetheless reasonable to infer that Congress could not have intended section
526 to announce a blanket prohibition of the gray market for the
simple reason that there was no gray market as we know it today
when the statute was enacted. Congress cannot be deemed to
have addressed a problem which did not exist. The language of
section 526 is clearly broad on its face. It is equally apparent,
however, that COPIAT seeks to invoke section 526 to achieve a
purpose for which it could not have been intended. For these
reasons, the Supreme Court should not limit itself to a plain language interpretation of section 526, but rather should proceed to
analyze whether the challenged regulations are a reasonable construction of the statute.
2.

Reasonable Construction of Section 526

Both the Federal Petitioners and K Mart Corporation take
the position that the Supreme Court should uphold 19 C.F.R.
§ 133.21 as long as the regulation is "reasonably related to the
purposes of" section 526.224 The petitioners note that section
624 of the Tariff Act empowers the Secretary of the Treasury to
Brief for Federal Petitioners, supra note 46, at 14.
Id. at 23.
See id. at 13.
See supra text accompanying note 48.
See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
Brief for Federal Petitioners, supra note 46, at 31-32 (citing Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 359 (1973) (quoting Thorpe v. Housing
Authority of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969)); Brief for Petitioner K Mart at
14, K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 56 U.S.L.W. 4219 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1988) (Nos. 86217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
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issue regulations implementing the Act's provisions. 225 As such,
the petitioners maintain that 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 should be
treated as a legislative regulation carrying the force of law pursuant to an express delegation of agency authority from Congress. 2 26 Because 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 gives effect to the "basic
objective that Congress expressed throughout the debate," that
of protecting independent trademark purchasers, the petitioners
suggest the regulation is a reasonable construction of section
526.227

COPIAT rejects the petitioners' position with the argument
that section 624 of the Tariff Act merely delegates agency authority "to fill in the details of the personal use exemption" of section
526(d) and does not apply to section 526(a).228 COPIAT fails to
elucidate, however, why the general agency authority contained
in section 624 should be applied so narrowly.2 2 9 COPIAT advances a stronger argument when it asserts that 19 C.F.R.
§ 133.21 is not a permissible interpretation of section 526.230
This position is weak, however, because it interprets the ambigu495, 86-624, 86-625) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Brief for K Mart]. See supra
note 25 (discussing consolidation of this action).
225 See Brief for Federal Petitioners, supra note 46, at 31 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1624
(1982)); Brief for K Mart, supra note 224, at 12. Section 624 provides in pertinent
part that "the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter." 19 U.S.C.
§ 1624.
226 See Brief for K Mart, supra note 224, at 11-14. K Mart asserts that "agency
rules promulgated under an express delegation of authority 'shall have the full
force and effect of law.' " Id. at 12 (quoting General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125, 141 (1976)). In support of this proposition, K Mart cited numerous decisions in which agency regulations have been held to have legislative effect. Id. at
12-13 n.9 (citing Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977) (regulations under
Social Security Act); Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356,
369 (1973) (regulations under Truth-in-Lending Act); American Trucking Ass'n v.
United States, 344 U.S. 298, 312 (1953) (ICC regulations)).
227 Brief for Federal Petitioners, supra note 46, at 33; see also Brief for K Mart,
supra note 224, at 15-24. In the alternative, K Mart asserted that 19 C.F.R. § 133.21
should be upheld as a reasonable exercise of the Customs Service's enforcement
discretion. See id. at 14-15. K Mart suggests that "[a]n agency decision not to enforce a statute to its farthest limits is generally left for Congress to review." Id. at
14 (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 105 S. Ct. 1649, 1657 (1985)). On this basis, K Mart
maintained that the Customs Service may choose to limit enforcement under section 526 for reasons of administrative convenience. Id. K Mart also observed that
the court of appeals recognized the Customs Service's enforcement discretion in
Vivitar and Olympus. Id. (citing Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1568-70; Olympus, 792 F.2d at
320-21).
228 Brief for COPIAT, supra note 184, at 37-38.
229 See id.
230 See id. at 48-49.
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ous legislative history of section 526 to demonstrate "clear intent" that Congress indeed intended to outlaw the gray market in
enacting section 526.23 l COPIAT also asserts that 19 C.F.R.
§ 133.21 cannot be considered a reasonable exercise of enforcement discretion simply because the regulations do not constitute
"the kind of reasonable agency interpretation . . .[to which] this
Court has deferred" in the past. 2 3 2 COPIAT offers little support
for this position, however.2 3
The Federal Petitioners argue persuasively that, despite any
ambiguity, the floor debate on section 526 repeatedly emphasized two limited purposes: (1) overruling the Second Circuit decision in Katzel, and (2) protecting independent American
trademark purchasers.2 3 4 It is also clear that Congress could not
have intended to prohibit the gray market, an international trade
situation which did not exist at the time. Because 19 C.F.R.
§ 133.21 effectuates the purposes noted above, and yet at the
same time does not purport to govern a situation section 526
could not have intended to reach, the regulation should be considered at least a reasonable construction of section 526.
3.

Legislative Ratification

Both the Federal and gray marketeer petitioners also contend that 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 should be upheld under the doctrine of legislative ratification.2 3 5 Under this doctrine, if
Congress is aware of an agency interpretation which conflicts
with a statute and re-enacts that statute without taking corrective
action, Congress may be deemed to have ratified the agency interpretation. 236 One commentator observed that this argument
is frequently advanced in trade and tariff matters because Congress so frequently amends law in these areas. 23 7' The importance of this doctrine has been commonly overstated, however,
and courts have exercised restraint in endorsing passive legisla231 See
232 See
233 See
234 See
235 See

id.
id. at 50.
id.
Brief for Federal Petitioners, supra note 46, at 18-20.
Brief for Federal Petitioners, supra note 46, at 41-43; Brief for K Mart,
supra note 224, at 24-31; Brief for 47th Street Photo, supra note 12, at 36-40.
236 See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.14 at 67 (2d ed. 1979 &
Supp. 1982).
237 See Elliott, supra note 198, at 32. Elliott notes that a legislative ratification
argument is "easily available in most tariff and trade related cases simply because
Congress, exercising its Constitutional mandate to 'regulate foreign commerce' is
almost perpetually at work doing so .... Id.
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tion. 2 38 It is significant to note, moreover, that courts have hesitated to apply the doctrine when a statute is merely amended and
not re-enacted in its entirety.2 3 9
The petitioners have suggested that Congress implicitly ratified 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 on numerous occasions. First, the defendants assert that the Customs Service's administrative
exceptions to section 526 were brought to Congress' attention in
1954 and in 1959 when bills were introduced to amend or repeal
the statute.2 40 Specifically, a proposed amendment to the Customs Simplification Act of 1954 would have codified exceptions
to section 526 whose language closely resembled Customs Service regulations in effect at the time. 24 1 Also, an amendment to
the Lanham Act, proposed in 1959 following vacation of the controversial Guerlain decision, would have repealed section 526.242
Neither bill, however, was ever enacted.
The gray marketeers also contend that Congress again implicitly ratified 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 in 1976 and 1978.243 In those
years, Congress considered amending section 526 to permit importation of limited quantities of marked goods for personal use
without permission from the United States trademark owner.2 4 4
In both instances, a house report noted that the Customs Service
had interpreted section 526 to provide no protection to a United
States trademark owner when "the foreign producer has been authorized by the American trade-mark owner to sell abroad"
goods bearing that mark.2 4 5 The defendants contend that ConSee 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 236, § 7.14 at 67.
See Elliott, supra note 198, at 34. Elliott stated that "the doctrine [of legislative ratification] applies to the 're-enactment' of statutes, not necessarily of amendments thereto which add new sections." Id.
240 See Brief for Federal Petitioners, supra note 46, at 41-43; accord Brief for 47th
Street Photo, supra note 12, at 36-40; Brief for K Mart, supra note 224, at 24-31.
241 See S. 2540, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 36 (1954); H.R. 9476, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1954).
242 See H.R. 7234, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text (discussing Guerlain).
243 See Brief for Federal Petitioners, supra note 46, at 41-42; Brief for 47th Street
Photo, supra note 12, at 37; Brief for K Mart, supra note 224, at 38 (all citing Customs Procedural Reform and Simplification Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-410, 92
Stat. 888, 903 (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1525(d) (1982))).
244 See H.R. 9220, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1975); Customs Procedural Reform and
Simplification Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-410, 92 Stat. 888, 903 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1526(d)). See also supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text
(discussing enactment of section 526(d)).
245 See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., BACKGROUND
MATERIALS ON H.R. 9220, THE PROPOSED CUSTOMS MODERNIZATION ACT OF 1975
54 (Comm. Print 1976); H.R. REP. No. 621, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1977).
238
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gress' failure to overrule the Customs Service despite its supposed awareness of current administrative practice is tantamount
to implicit ratification.246
While the legislative ratification argument has convinced
three district courts and one appellate court, 2 4 7 it is flawed for a
variety of reasons. First, only in 1959 did Congress reconsider
section 526 in its entirety, and even then Congress declined to
repeal the statute. 248 The fact that Congress balked at repeal of
section 526 at the time would,
if anything, imply rejection of the
24 9
regulation, not acceptance.

Second, the petitioners' reliance upon house reports relating
to the personal use exemption of section 526(d) ignores basic
realities of the Congressional decision making process.250 A
leading commentator on administrative law has observed that
"the committees or subcommittees of Congress may or may not
know of outstanding interpretations when they are considering
reenactment; they do not in fact reenact what they know nothing
about."' 25 '

With this in mind, the defendants' reliance on a

house report regarding a statutory amendment presents a weak
case indeed for legislative ratification.
Finally, it is significant to note that a bill has been introduced
in Congress which, if enacted, would codify 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 as
an amendment to section 526.252 Thus, Congress is now looking
squarely at whether the policies expressed in 19 C.F.R. § 133.21
should carry the force of law. With this in mind, it would be particularly inappropriate for the Court to find implied ratification of
19 C.F.R. § 133.21 when the issue is pending before Congress.
246 See Brief for Federal Petitioners, supra note 46, at 41-43; Brief for 47th Street
Photo, supra note 12, at 36-40; and Brief for K Mart, supra note 224, at 24-31.
247 Compare Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1568 ("Legislation by silence is too tenuous a
theory to merit extended discussion.") and COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 917
("[U]nsuccessful efforts . . . to repeal or modify section 526, if anything, would
suggest that Congress rejected a narrow view of its scope.") with Olympus, 762 F.2d at
320-21 ("Congress was informed that the Customs Service permitted parallel importation when it considered amending the Customs law in 1954 ....
and specifically noted the practice and yet chose not to amend it while amending other parts
of section 526 in 1978.") (citations omitted).
248 See H.R. 7234, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in 49 TRADEMARK REP.
671, 671-73 (1959).
249 See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 917.
250 See 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 236, § 7.14, at 67-68.
251 See id.
252 See S. 2614, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
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Deference To Agency Interpretation

Both Federal and gray marketeer petitioners have contended
that 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 is entitled to judicial deference on the
theory that the Customs Service regulations under section 526
have been both consistent and longstanding, and therefore
should not be overturned. 2 53 As the District of Columbia and
Second Circuits recognized, however, the Customs Service regulations under section 526 have not been consistent in substance
2 54
and also have not reflected any consistent underlying policy.
A brief review of successive regulations implementing section 526 suffices to illustrate this point. Between 1923 and 1936
there were no administrative exceptions to the statute, but authorized third party imports were permitted.2 5 5 Then, between
1936 and 1953, the Treasury Department exempted trademark
owners from protection when both United States and foreign
trademarks were owned by the same legal entity. 25 6 Subsequently, between 1953 and 1959, the regulations further exempted related entities from protection, but in practice this
policy was enforced inconsistently. 257 Then, between 1959 and
1972 Customs enforced section 526 with respect to related entity
trademark owners but continued to exempt same entity trademark owners from protection. 258 Finally, in 1972, the Customs
Service restored the related entity exception. 25 9 These changes
in the definition of administrative exception to section 526 undermine the petitioners' contention that challenged regulation
has been consistent since its inception.
Furthermore, the Customs Service has failed to articulate a
consistent policy basis for its administrative exceptions throughout the period since 1936. Prior to 1936, the relevant regulations shed little light on the Customs Service policy, merely
stating that trademark owners were entitled to protection under
section 526.260 When the Customs Service amended its regulations in 1936, the agency offered no explanation for its apparent
253 See Brief for Federal Petitioners, supra note 46, at 36-41; Brief for 47th Street
Photo, supra note 12, at 30-36; Brief for K Mart, supra note 224, at 31-37.
254 See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 913-17; Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1565-68.

255 See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
256 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
257 See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
258 See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.

259 See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
260 See Customs Regulations of 1923, Art. 475-80 (superceded 1931), and Customs Regulations of 1931, Art. 518(a) (superceded 1936). See supra notes 74-75 for
text of these regulations.
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shift in policy. 2 6 1 Similarly, the Customs Service was virtually silent when it changed the regulations again in 1953.262 A 1951
letter from Customs Commissioner Dow to Senator Douglas,
however, suggests that contemporaneous agency policy was
based on the theory that a trademark owner could not restrict the
flow of marked goods once it had permitted them to enter the
stream of commerce. 2 6' Again, no official explanation was offered for the 1959 regulatory change, but it is reasonable to infer
that the regulation was amended in response to the failure of legislative efforts following Guerlain.2 6 4 Finally, the Customs Service
gave no official reason for changing its regulation again in 1972,
but correspondence indicates that the current regulation is
founded on the Custom Service's interpretation of the legislative

history of section 526.265
In Olympus, a majority of the Second Circuit ruled that the
regulations implementing section 526 have been sufficiently consistent to warrant judicial deference.2 6 6 The position of the Olympus majority, however, is simply untenable in light of the
foregoing analysis. Indeed, Judge Winter's dissent in Olympus
261 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. See also Brief for COPIAT, supra
note 184, at 42. Elaborating on the Custom Service's wavering policy, COPIAT
asserts further that the 1936 regulations were merely intended to implement the
Trade-Mark Act of 1905, not section 526. See id. at 42-43 (citing Hearings on H.R. 82
Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 57-105, 14154 (1944)).
262 See Brief of COPIAT, supra note 184, at 44.
263 See Letter from Frank Dow, Commissioner of Customs, to Sen. Paul Douglas
(Mar. 23, 1951) (quoted in Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 430). The Commissioner of
Customs wrote:
As interpreted by the Bureau, section 526 prohibits importation of genuine articles of foreign origin bearing a genuine trade-mark valid in the
foreign country, which articles were not produced by or with the authority of the United States owner of such mark. ...
However, if the United States trade-mark owner and the owner of
the foreign rights to the same mark are one and the same person, articles produced and sold abroad by the foreign owner may be imported
by anyone for the reason that the trade-mark owner has himself introduced the articles into commerce or authorized such introduction and
may not unreasonably restrict the use of the product thereafter. For this
purpose a foreign subsidiary or licensee of the United States trade-mark
owner is considered to stand in the same shoes as such trade-mark
owner.
Id.
264 See Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 430.
265 See supra notes 104-07 and sources cited therein.
266 See Olympus, 792 F.2d at 319; but see Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1568; COPIAT, 790
F.2d at 913-16 (both stating Customs Service regulations have not been sufficiently
consistent to warrant judicial deference).
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summarizes aptly the history of the Customs Service policy, "The
fact is that the Customs Service has over the years justified this
regulation with arguments of opportunity tailored to whatever
audience it happened to be addressing at the time. "267 Because
the Customs Service has displayed none of the consistency which
would permit a court to defer to longstanding administrative policy, it would clearly inappropriate for the United States Supreme
Court to endorse 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 on this basis.
V.

CONCLUSION

Assuming the Court rejects the jurisdictional argument advanced by 47th Street Photo, Inc., 68 in analyzing the questions
before the Court, it is important to recognize that the broad policy issue of whether gray goods should be permitted has not been
litigated in any of the three recent declaratory actions and has
not been raised before the Supreme Court in K Mart. As noted
above, a heated policy debate rages between trademark owners
such as COPIAT and gray marketeers.2 6 9 Until recently, however, Congress has failed to address the difficult questions
presented in the gray goods controversy. 2 70 The recent flurry of
judicial activity, if nothing else, will hopefully provide additional
impetus for legislative activity.
Setting policy considerations aside, the preceding analysis
shows that the common control exceptions contained in 19
C.F.R. § 133.21 should be upheld as a reasonable construction of
section 526. Despite the inconsistency of the regulations, despite
the weakness of the petitioners' legislative ratification argument,
despite the concededly broad language of the statute, and despite its brief and occasionally ambiguous legislative history, it
remains clear that section 526 was enacted for the limited purpose of protecting independent trademark purchasers. As the
Federal Petitioners aptly stated, Congress did not set out to create "a mechanism to help foreign or multinational corporations
to enforce exclusive U.S. distribution arrangements." 2 7 ' Indeed,
Congress could not have intended to prohibit the gray market
when it enacted section 526: the problem simply did not exist in
the early 1920's.
267 See Olympus, 792 F.2d at 322 (Winter, J., dissenting).
268 See supra notes 179-204 and accompanying text.
269 See supra notes 10-25 and accompanying text.

270 S. 2614, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
271 Brief for Federal Petitioners, supra note 46, at 21.
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In ruling on this question, the District of Columbia Circuit
focused on the plain language of section 526 and declared the
common control exceptions of 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 invalid on that
basis. As the Supreme Court reviews the COPIAT decision,
COPIAT again urges that the Court adopt a literal interpretation
of section 526. Because Congress has not addressed the precise
question at issue, however, this author suggests that a plain language interpretation is inappropriate in this instance and that the
decision of the District of Columbia Circuit should be reversed.
James F. Baxley

[As this number was going to press, the Supreme Court rendered
an interim decision in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,Inc., * affirming the

district court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction and restoring the action to the calendar for reargument on its merits. Reargument is scheduled for April 26, 1988.]
* 56 U.S.L.W. 4219 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1988) (Nos. 86-495, 86-624, 86-625), aff'g in
part, granting reh 'g to Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v.
United States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

